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The language of the Bill of Rights is almost entirely gender
neutral and its provisions have always applied to some women.'
But free white men of property designed the Bill of Rights in a
political process from which they excluded most Americans and all
women. Not surprisingly, the Bill of Rights served and serves the
interests of such men better than the interests of others.
Legal constitutional literature, whether from the right or the
left, tends to be celebratory rather than critical. But in looking
back on the Bill of Rights during this bicentennial year, women
and many men outside the propertied white male class should be
ambivalent. In this Article, I assess the Bill of Rights from the per-
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' The Bill of Rights is almost entirely free of gendered language. It speaks repeatedly of
"person" or "people." The Fifth Amendment contains one "himself" and the Sixth Amend-
ment one "him" and two "his's." Thus, one has the right not to be "compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself," US Const, Amend V (emphasis added); the right
of the criminal defendant "to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense," US Const, Amend VI (emphasis added). But the clauses containing these ref-
erences were understood as applying to "free" women from the first.
2 See, for example, John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U
Chi L Rev 13 (1992); Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat
to Liberty, 59 U Chi L Rev 225 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U Chi L Rev
255 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U Chi L Rev 115
(1992); and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U Chi L Rev 195
(1992).'
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spective of women and other outsiders, with special emphasis on
its continuing impact on women's political participation. I offer
three kinds of criticisms in discussing specific clauses.
First, and most important, I make a point that is not norma-
tive or prescriptive but merely critical: the Bill of Rights does less
to solve the problems of women and nonpropertied men than to
solve the problems of men of property, especially white men of
property. Some clauses, such as the Fifth Amendment right to
"property," originally did not help most women, or helped only
trivially, or had vastly different meanings for women and men.
Often this disparity continues. Some provisions overlook much
more serious problems for women than the problems they address.
Consider, for example, women's Fourth Amendment right "to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unrea-
sonable [governmental] searches and seizures."3  The Fourth
Amendment neither gives women security in their homes from
husbands nor ensures that government treat marital rape like
other rapes and assaults. Indeed, at the time the Fourth Amend-
ment was adopted, and in many jurisdictions today, husbands and
lovers could and can rape "their" women without criminal
consequences.
Some provisions operate differently for women and men in the
sense that they perpetuate women's subordinate status. Although
many historical inequities would have persisted without the Bill of
Rights, the Bill magnifies these inequities. For example, the Reli-
gion Clauses permit substantial subsidies from government to
mostly-patriarchal religious organizations-organizations that con-
tinue to be important socializing institutions for children.
Second, although the Bill of Rights may not cause a given
problem, it sometimes impedes legislative reform. We revere the
Bill of Rights;4 its invocation legitimates the status quo. For exam-
ple, the Second Amendment assists the National Rifle Association
in preventing stringent federal gun control legislation. Thus, al-
though gun control might be good for women, and is favored by
most wqmen,5 the Second Amendment impedes its adoption.
My third point concerns politics. Several provisions of the Bill
of Rights have continuing political effects, impeding women's effec-
s US Const, Amend IV.
' See, for example, Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights
That Belong to Us All", 74 J Amer Hist 1013 (1987).
Katherine M. Jamieson and Timothy J. Flanagan, eds, Sourcebook of Criminal Jus-
tice Statistics 110, Table 2.43 (US Dept of Justice, 1987).
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tive political participation today. Consider, for example, Buckley v
Valeo, which held unconstitutional spending limits on individuals
directly engaging in political speech, thus constitutionalizing the
right of the rich to participate in the political process more effec-
tively than the poor.6 And women are, of course, disproportionately
poor.'
More fundamentally, the Bill of Rights is inadequate in guar-
anteeing women the exercise of governmental power. Given that
women were excluded from the process that produced the Bill of
Rights and that few women occupy high government positions to-
day, we should question the legitimacy of our purported democ-
racy. Surely we would question whether another government was
truly democratic if a majority group, other than women, had never
held the top executive position and comprised only six percent of
the national legislature." Only six percent of governors are women.9
Women hold only eighteen percent of state-wide elective offices.' 0
Women occupy only 18.1 percent of state legislative seats.'"
Women are similarly under-represented in judicial positions at
the state and federal levels. At the state level, only 2.8 percent of
the law-trained trial court judges are women; 5.5 percent of inter-
mediate appellate state judges are women.12 On state supreme
courts, 5.89 percent of justices are women; 0.56 percent are minor-
ity women. 3 At the federal level, women comprise only 4.07 per-
cent of administrative law judges; seven percent of district court
judges; eight percent of appellate judges; and 11.11 percent of the
6 424 US 1, 58-59 (1976).
7 See, for example, 163 Current Population Reports: Consumer Income: Poverty in the
United States: 1987, 118-19 (US Bureau of the Census, 1989).
8 See Center for the American Woman and Politics (CAWP), Fact Sheet: Women in
Elective Office 1991, Table 2 (Eagleton Institute, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
' The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1992 596-99 (World Almanac, 1991).
10 CAWP, Fact Sheet: Statewide Elective Executive Women 1991 1 (Eagleton Insti-
tute, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
" Id.
2 Telephone conversation with Dixie Noble, National Association of Women Judges,
Williamsburg, Virginia (Oct 3, 1991) (notes on file with U Chi L Rev). This data was current
as of the date of the call for the intermediate and appellate state courts. The data on trial
court judges is from 1985. I have not been able to find data on minority judges in other
categories.
13 Id.
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Supreme Court. No women serve as senior appellate judges and
less than two percent of the senior trial judges are women. 14
Two points recur in my criticisms of various clauses. The Bill
of Rights incorporates a private-public split 15 with only negative
rights under a limited government. As a result, women's activities
and concerns-from economic rights to religion-seem beyond the
proper scope of government. That women are poorer than, and
subordinate to, men appears "natural" and pre-political. Because
of the private-public split, the Bill of Rights protects a number of
institutions that are not entirely good for women from governmen-
tal interference and effective reform, such as the media. Because
the Bill of Rights incorporates only "negative" rights, it includes
no provision guaranteeing, or even defining as an important con-
cern of national government, the economic and educational rights
so important to women as caretakers. Indeed, women in the United
States have fewer economic and educational supports than in any
other North Atlantic nation.
To a large extent, my criticisms could apply to any written set
of cryptic, abstract, and negative rights enforced by judges. Any
such scheme will better protect the powerful against government
action harmful to their interests than the less powerful, who need
protection against the powerful as well as against the government.
In part, this is because abstract rights enforced by judges, regard-
less of their wording, are unlikely to make radical changes in the
distribution of power and resources.' 6 The less powerful need many
concrete, positive rights. These rights require detailed implementa-
tion schemes and the expenditure of funds. Judges are not likely to
order either when enforcing abstract clauses. For example, no mat-
ter how a constitution states its equality provision, it is unlikely
that the provision would lead judges to restructure the social se-
curity system so as to provide equivalent old-age security to bread-
winners and homemakers. 7
" Id. For discussions of this problem, see Carl Tobias, The Federal Judiciary Engen-
dered, 5 Wis Women's L J 123 (1990); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender:
Women, Jurisdiction and the Federal Courts, 66 NYU L Rev (forthcoming 1992).
"5 For a discussion of the inconsistencies in the way we look at the public-private split,
see Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 Harv L Rev 1497 (1983).
"' See, for example, Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change? (Chicago, 1991); Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987
S Ct Rev 201.
" See Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security,
and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 Colum L Rev 264, 271-
85 (1989).
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We cannot, therefore, expect a piece of paper to produce jus-
tice for women or other disadvantaged groups.'8 I nevertheless sug-
gest a number of ways in which the Bill of Rights could be im-
proved through interpretation or amendment. For example, courts
could redefine, or legislatures amend, the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment to prohibit government subsidies to religions
that close the ministry to women. Courts could read the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment to allow content-based
governmental regulation of some sexist and racist speech, or subsi-
dies for nonsexist speech.
Some of my points focus on the underclass, rather than
women as such. It is impossible to separate the interests of women
from those of their class and race. When, for example, justice is
denied the urban underclass in the criminal "justice" system,
women inevitably suffer even though most of those caught directly
in the system are men. Women suffer the destruction of their com-
munities as well as the destruction of the men and boys who are, or
might have been, in their lives.
In the Conclusion, I make several general points not directed
at specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. An ideal Constitution or
Bill of Rights would contain a substantive sex equality provision.
At a minimum, such a provision could require judges to take into
account detrimental impact on women when approaching other
constitutional provisions as well as legislation and other govern-
mental action. 19
In the Conclusion, I address more basic structural problems
with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. First, I note that our
constitutional structure, with its emphasis on individual rights
conceived in absolutist and negative terms, particularly property
rights, contributes to a culture in which the kinds of economic
rights women need are difficult to achieve. Mary Ann Glendon
makes this point in her most recent book.20 Absolutist individual
rights are almost inevitably negative limits on government. Giving
constitutional sanctity to negative rights only, with a central role
for property rights, reinforces American faith in rugged individual-
ism which is so incompatible with the needs of children and their
caretakers.
8 See, for example, Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 10-13 (cited in note 16): Becker,
1987 S Ct Rev 201 (cited in note 16).
1' See note 301 and accompanying text.
20 Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 14, 24-
25 (Free Press, 1991).
1992]
The University of Chicago Law Review
I also discuss some of the ways in which our constitutional
structure is countermajoritarian. The Framers deliberately devised
a government that would protect the propertied minority from op-
pression by the propertyless majority.2' We should see it as a prob-
lem of democracy that, to date, women have not exercised their
share of governmental power. I suggest that other governmental
structures and electoral systems might be more democratic.22In as many sections, I discuss seven clauses or sets of clauses
in the Bill of Rights: the Religion Clauses 23 and Free Speech
Clause 24 of the First Amendment; the right to bear arms of the
Second Amendment;25 protections against misuse of the criminal
justice system in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments;2 the
right to be secure in one's home under the Fourth Amendment;27
the property right of the Fifth Amendment; 2s and the Due Process
right of the Fifth Amendment, together with the jury provisions of
the Sixth and Seventh Amendments.29 I begin with the first two
clauses of the First Amendment, which "guarantee" freedom of re-
ligion. I discuss the religion clauses in greater depth than the
others because there have been so few explorations in the legal
literature of the problems religion poses for women.30
I. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The Bill of Rights begins with the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."3' All of my
criticisms apply to both of these provisions. Religious freedom has
meant, and means, vastly different things to women and men. In a
number of ways this freedom secures to men rights superior to
11 Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism:
The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy 220-22 (Chicago, 1990).
22 See notes 293-300 and accompanying text.
23 See Section I.
24 See Section II.
22 See Section III.
24 See Section IV.
21 See Section V.
28 See Section VI.
29 See Section VII.
1o For examples of articles that do discuss the patriarchal nature of religion, see Judith
C. Miles, Beyond Bob Jones: Toward the Elimination of Governmental Subsidy of Discrim-
ination by Religious Institutions, 8 Harv Women's L J 31 (1985); Kathleen A. McDonald,
Battered Wives, Religion, and Law: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2 Yale J L and Femi-
nism 251 (1990); Judith Resnik, On the Bias, Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations
of Our Judges, 61 S Cal L Rev 1877, 1918-21 (1988).
31 US Const, Amend I.
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those secured to women. As I discuss below, religion perpetuates
and reinforces women's subordination, and religious freedom im-
pedes reform. The Religion Clauses allow substantial government
subsidies of religion, such as exemptions from income and property
taxes and awards of government contracts, thus assisting religion
in perpetuating the subordination of women. Religious freedom
also impedes women's effective political participation.
I divide the discussion of religion into four parts. I begin with
a discussion of the ways in which religious practices and doctrine
contribute to traditional attitudes towards women and their appro-
priate roles. Next, I discuss positive aspects of the relationship be-
tween religion and women: religion has often empowered women
and has responded to and reflected the beliefs and values of
women, who are, in general, more religious than men. Third, I con-
sider empirical evidence on the relationship between religion and
women's subordinate status. This evidence indicates that, despite
the positive potential of religion and the ways in which women
shape religion, mainstream Christian religions in the United States
tend to contribute to women's subordinate status and to retard
women's ability to participate fully and effectively in political life.
I discuss several examples of current governmental subsidies of
mostly-patriarchal religion. I conclude the Section by suggesting
that the Religion Clauses be interpreted or amended to minimize
their countermajoritarian effect while still preserving the positive
potential of religion.
A. Religion and Patriarchy
The religious freedom clauses do not have the same meaning
for women and men. For the Framers, the social reality of religious
freedom meant their own freedom and the freedom of other men of
their race and class to develop, govern, and control religion free of
state interference. Even men of other races and classes could be
religious leaders. For example, prior, even, to emancipation sepa-
rate black churches developed led by black preachers.32 These sep-
arate churches laid the foundation for an autonomous African-
American Christianity.33
Religious freedom has not had this meaning for women. Reli-
gious leaders have been overwhelmingly male from the time the
32 See, for example, Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves
Made 255-79 (Pantheon, 1974).
*1 Id at 280.
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Bill .of Rights was passed until the present day. Many religious
groups, including Mormons, Roman Catholics, and Orthodox Jews,
still close the ministry to women. Other groups allow female minis-
ters, but women still lead those groups in relatively low numbers,
especially in the organizational hierarchy or at the head of large
and important congregations.14
Male control of religious leadership has a number of negative
effects. Only men are able to use positions as religious leaders to
rise in the social hierarchy and to become leaders in their commu-
nities. The absence of women in leadership positions suggests to
younger women and girls that women are not capable of leader-
ship. Most important, because mainstream religious leadership has
been and remains so dominated by men, mainstream religion inevi-
tably incorporates male perspectives and bias against women. As
one (male) student of comparative religion put it, "regardless of
what a religion teaches about the status of women, or what its atti-
tudes toward sex might be, if women are excluded from the institu-
tions. and positions that influence society, a general misogynism
seems to result."3 5  Religions thus contribute to women's
subordinate status, not only within religious communities' hierar-
chies, but also in the broader culture.
At the time the Bill of Rights was passed, mainstream Ameri-
can religions taught the subordination of women openly and with-
out embarrassment. For example, the Reverend Amos Chase de-
scribed women's divinely ordained position of inferiority in a
funeral sermon in Litchfield, Connecticut in 1791:
A woman of fine feelings cannot be insensible that her consti-
tutional condition is secondary and dependant [sic] among
men. Nor can she long want conviction that the sure way to
avoid any evil (to the thus dependant) [sic] is to yield the
front of battle to a hardier sex.3 6
Religion was often used to legitimate the use of the state's
power to enforce women's inferior social position. For example, in
" See, for example, Keith A. Roberts, Religion in Sociological Perspective 291-94
(Wadsworth, 2d ed 1990).
"' Vern L. Bullough, The Subordinate Sex: A History of Attitudes Toward Women 134
(Illinois, 1973).
"' Amos Chase, On Female Excellence, or a Discourse in which Good Character in
Women is Described, Occasioned by the Death of his Wife 12 (delivered at Litchfield,
March 6, 1791), as quoted in Nancy Falik Cott, In the Bonds of Womanhood: Perspectives
on Female Experience and Consciousness in New England 1780-1830 99 (1974) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University (Waltham)) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
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Bradwell v Illinois, the Supreme Court upheld a statute barring
women from the practice of law, with three concurring justices us-
ing divine law to justify a man-made law by which men gave them-
selves a monopoly in the practice of law. 7
Today, mainstream religions in the United States remain pa-
triarchal in many ways. I begin with a discussion of substantive
problems with religious doctrines and practices from the perspec-
tive of women.3 8 The Religion Clauses have given men a compara-
tively greater ability to develop meaning, values, and morality
based on an authority independent of government and made in
their image. Although religion means much to women, it has not
meant this.
1. Creation, male gods, and Eve.
All mainstream religious traditions in the United States re-
place the wonder of women's reproductive power with stories of
creation by a male god.3 9 In one of the two creation myths in Gene-
sis, God created Eve out of Adam's rib to be his partner (rather
than a being with her own purposes).40 Eve tempts Adam and her
reproductive power becomes a punishment for sin in the story of
the fall.4 Because of her sin, God declares Adam her master.42
Christianity adds, as a prerequisite to true life, rebirth through re-
demption by a male god.43
Although there is an occasional use of female imagery in the
Judeo-Christian tradition-in the Wisdom literature, for exam-
ple4 4-the gods of that tradition are overwhelmingly male. The
Christian "God the Father" is the ultimate male warrior: utterly
" 83 US (16 Wallace) 130, 132, 139 (1872).
38 I have organized the discussion in the subsection in seven points, some of which ap-
ply to Jews and Christians, others of which apply only to Christians. Because most religious
Americans are Jews or Christians, and because my space is limited, I examine only these
traditions.
11 Beverly Wildung Harrison, Our Right to Choose: Toward a New Ethic of Abortion
60-61 (Beacon, 1983); Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism 73-89
(Beacon, 1990).
4" Genesis 2:18-23 (New English Bible). A less sexist version of creation is presented in
the first story of creation. See Genesis 1:26-28.
" Genesis 3:16-19 (New English Bible):
To the Woman he said: "I will increase your labor and your groaning, and in labour
you shall bear children. You shall be eager for your husband, and he shall be your
master."
" See id.
" Harrison, Our Right to Choose 59-61 (cited in note 39); Daly, Gyn/Ecology at 83-89
(cited in note 39).
"' See, for example, The Wisdom of Solomon 10: 1-19 (New English Bible).
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alone and without need for others or the ability to empathize with
them, the unmoved mover.45 More than the language ascribes
maleness; the Old Testament God typifies the masculine warrior
hero in western culture, violent and overpowering, striking down
his enemies.46 Jesus is, by contrast, often very feminine,47 but his
gender is clearly male. Although Mary sometimes has near-divinity
status, she is a singularly passive and subservient god.
It is easy to dismiss this complaint as silly or unimportant.
The effect of male gods goes unnoticed because it is so ubiquitous,
and is effective because so consistent with male domination in our
culture. If you look around, you will see widespread and severe
under-representation of women in positions of power, as gods, in
the ministry, as heroes, and as authorities, whether in religion or
sports or the military or the evening news. Some of these problems
are discussed elsewhere in this article.48 The cumulative effect is a
double message to girls. On one level, they hear, "you're equal,
you're equal, you're equal." But when they observe the world
around them, on television, in their history books, in their story
books, in literature or religion, girls receive a different message:
"you're not, you're not, you're not." Almost exclusively, they see
males as active heroes and in positions of power and honor. Not
surprisingly, girls and young women have less self-esteem and con-
fidence than boys and men.49
Men in our culture fail to appreciate the advantages of having
gods in their image. But women who can imagine a female god,
despite indoctrination in religions with male gods, can sense the
power of such images. Someone raised in the white Judeo-Chris-
tian tradition has extreme difficulty imagining a female god. But
"' For feminist insight on the vision of "God the Father" as a male figure, see Catherine
Keller, From a Broken Web: Separation, Sexism and Self 38-40, 86-87 (Beacon, 1986);
Carol P. Christ, Laughter of Aphrodite: Reflections on a Journey to the Goddess 93-101
(Harper & Row, 1987); Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, Sex, Race, and God: Christian Femi-
nism in Black and White 109-25 (Crossroad, 1989).
"' See, for example, Psalm 7:12-13 (New English Bible): "He sharpens his sword,/ str-
ings his bow and makes it ready.fHe has prepared his deadly shafts and tipped his arrows
with fire."
"' For a discussion of the more feminine Jesus, central to the devotional life of many
Christian women, white and black, see text accompanying notes 87-88.
48 See text accompanying notes 152-59, 200, for example.
" American Association of University Women, Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging
America: A nationwide poll to assess self esteem, educational experiences, interest in math
and science, and career aspirations of girls and boys ages 9-15 graph B (following p 5)
(Greenberg-Lake Analysis Group, 1991) (in elementary school, girls' self-esteem is 79% of
boys'; in middle school and high school, 60% (calculation from figures in graph B)).
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just a glimpse of the Goddess can be startling and empowering."
Mainstream American religions have not offered women what they
offer men: the ability as leaders to develop powerful images of gods
like themselves.
2. Emphasis on family stability.
In addition, all mainstream religious traditions emphasize
family stability. Inequities exist in most families today, however,
where women generally work more hours a week than their hus-
bands because of the husbands' failure to share the second
shift-housework. Emphasis on family stability, at least without an
equal emphasis on the need for change within families, reinforces
current advantages of both power and leisure that men enjoy
within families. Religion encourages women to live with the status
quo rather than destabilizing it by insisting on equality. For bat-
tered women, this emphasis reinforces their tendency to think only
of the needs of others51 and to try to keep the "family together at
all costs-even the woman's life."' 52 Again, religion does not do the
same thing for women and men.
3. Fundamentalism, orthodoxy, and women's subordinate
status.
Today, fundamentalist and orthodox religious groups, such as
fundamentalist Christians, continue to teach, explicitly or implic-
itly, that women should be subordinate to men. For example, fun-
damentalist Christians still often state overtly that wives should
submit to husbands. In The Total Woman, Marabel Morgan de-
scribes the "biblical remedy for marital conflict": "'wives must
submit to [their] husbands' leadership in the same way [they] sub-
mit to the Lord,'" citing Paul's letter to the Ephesians."3
Orthodox Jews state less explicitly that wives should submit to
husbands, but orthodox belief and practice implies women's inferi-
ority in at least four different ways. First, Judaism is phallocentric:
60 Catherine Keller discusses parallels between the opening of Genesis and earlier Bab-
ylonian creation myths and concludes that the earlier Goddess is reflected in certain words
in Genesis. I was thrilled (and amazed at how thrilling it was) to find such a revelation in
the words I had been taught to revere as a child. See Keller, From a Broken Web at 80-88
(cited in note 45).
01 Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Cri-
tique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis Women's L J 81, 98 (1987).
52 Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman 164 (Harper & Row, 1979).
51 Marabel Morgan, The Total Woman 69 (Revell, 1973) (quoting The Living Bible
Ephesians 5:22 (Tyndale House, 1971)).
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a mark on the penises of baby boys symbolizes "Abraham's
everlasting covenant with his god." The phallus is thus sanctified.54
Second, Jewish marriage and divorce law do not treat women
and men as equals.55 In both, women are passive, men are active.
In an Orthodox wedding, the bride says nothing. A divorce is
something a man effects and gives to a woman; she cannot remarry
unless he agrees to divorce her. Although she can demand a di-
vorce, and he should then give it to her, among the strictly Ortho-
dox she often has little recourse if he refuses.
Third, the obligation to worship and to study Torah, central to
the lives of Orthodox men, is less important for women, though
women should know enough Torah to be able to educate their chil-
dren. Implicit is the message that she counts less. Indeed, for pur-
poses of the minyan. (the quorum needed for certain prayers), she
does not count at all. Her husband begins the day by thanking God
that he was not born a woman. (Thereby, according to the least
objectionable meaning, expressing gratitude that he is called to
worship God and study Torah).6
Fourth, the Jewish faith relegates women to serving others,
rather than recognizing them as creatures with important spiritual
lives.57 Orthodox men serve God through prayer and study. Ortho-
dox women serve God through serving others. For very Orthodox
women, much of this service consists of cooking and cleaning under
circumstances made onerous by dietary laws.58
Fundamentalist religious groups encourage or require women
to fulfill traditional roles, including economic dependence on hus-
bands and serving others in the home. Yet economic dependence
on individual men weakens women's position within marriage. The
combination of traditional roles and fundamentalists' unusually
strong emphasis (relative even to other mainstream religious
groups) on family stability lessens fundamentalist women's ability
to object to traditional relationships between the sexes. Again, the
14 Batya Bauman, Women-identified Women in Male-identified Judaism, in Susannah
Heschel, ed, On Being a Jewish Feminist: A Reader 88, 91 (Schocken, 1983).
55 Saul Berman, The Status of Women in Halakhic Judaism, in Elizabeth Koltun, ed,
The Jewish Woman: New Perspectives 114, 115 (Schocken, 1976).
56 Thena Kendall, Memories of an Orthodox Youth in Heschel, ed, On Being a Jewish
Feminist: A Reader 96, 97-98 (cited in note 54).
57 Berman, The Status of Women in Halakhic Judaism at 116 (cited in note 55).
'8 Kendall, Memories of an Orthodox Youth (cited in note 56). At the same time giving
spiritual significance to women's work and the way it is done is in some ways positive, ac-
cording importance and value to women.
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main point is that religion does not offer women what it offers
men.
4. The core of Christianity: forgiving and suffering.
All strands of Christianity urge forgiving. Christianity teaches
that the virtuous person forgives even the unpardonable. Quoting
Matthew 18:22, Marabel Morgan advises wives to forgive "seventy
times seven. ' 59 Christianity also places a high value on suffering,
the archetype being Jesus's suffering during the crucifixion.
Forgiving and valuing suffering are not effective strategies for
an oppressed group to force social change. These activities rein-
force existing power disparities and encourage the disempowered
to accept their real-world disadvantages as spiritual advantages.
Forgiving and valuing suffering are particularly dangerous
strategies for battered women. 0 Such teachings encourage battered
women (who are all too likely to believe their batterers who ask
forgiveness and swear they will never do it again) to stay in ex-
tremely destructive relationships. Religious counselors often advise
battered women to "pray for guidance, become better women, and
go home and help their husbands 'become more spiritual and find
the Lord.' "61
Even more perversely, the Christian valuation of suffering en-
courages women to accept abuse. Christian theology glorifies vic-
timization, posing special hazards to women because society, as
well as Christianity, assigns them the "suffering-servant role. 6 2
Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker make this point
powerfully:
Christianity has been a primary-in many women's lives the
primary-force in shaping our acceptance of abuse. The cen-
tral image of Christ on the cross as the savior of the world
communicates the message that suffering is redemptive. If the
best person who ever lived gave his life for others, then, to be
of value we should likewise sacrifice ourselves. Any sense that
we have a right to care for our own needs is in conflict with
Morgan, The Total Woman at 144 (cited in note 53) (citing King James Version of
the Bible).
"0 See McDonald, 2 Yale J L and Feminism 251 (cited in note 30).
"X Walker, The Battered Woman at 23 (cited in note 52).
62 Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker, For God So Loved the World?, in Joanne
Carlson Brown and Carole R. Bohm, eds, Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse: A Feminist
Critique 1, 3 (Pilgrim, 1989).
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being a faithful follower of Jesus. Our suffering for others will
save the world.63
Thus, the values at the core of the Christian tradition reinforce
and contribute to women's suffering and subordination.
5. Female sexuality and mothering.
Traditionally, Judaism has linked women's bodies with un-
cleanliness, regarding menstrual blood and childbirth as polluting.
Prior to menopause, the Jewish faith deems a woman unclean for
two weeks of every month: while she is menstruating and for seven
days thereafter until she has "undergone ritual purification in a
mikveh" (ritual bath).6 4 After childbirth, purification of the wo-
man s body is also necessary. 5 Instead of celebrating women's re-
productive power, Judaism perceives women's bodies (and women
themselves) as unclean and polluted.
Judaism nevertheless sees marriage (and sexuality) as a posi-
tive experience, a necessary part of life for an observant member of
the community. The blessing given the newborn child is to grow up
to Torah, marriage, and good deeds. Orthodox congregations do
not hire unmarried rabbis nor do they usually hire unmarried
cantors.
Christianity more consistently approaches women's bodies and
sexuality negatively, linking women with sexuality and sexuality
with imperfection and sin.66 For example, Clement of Alexandria
wrote that for women, "the very consciousness of their own nature
must evoke feelings of shame. '6 The equation of women with sex
may seem odd,. since men seem more interested in genital sex than
women do. But, from the perspective of heterosexual men who feel
sexual desire but regard sexual intercourse as "filthiness" and "dis-
gustingness" (the terms belong to St. Thomas Aquinas6 ), there is
a certain logic in regarding women as the source of the evil. Were
there no women, these men would not be tempted to engage in
such repulsive activities.6 9
63 Id at 2.
6 Paula Hyman, The Other Half: Women in the Jewish Tradition, in Koltun, ed, The
Jewish Woman 105, 110-11 (cited in note 55).
65 Heschel, ed, On Being a Jewish Feminist: A Reader 286 (cited in note 54) (glossary
entry for mikvah at back of book).
16 Bullough, The Subordinate Sex at 97-101 (cited in note 35).
11 Uta Ranke-Heinemann, Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven: Women, Sexuality,
and the Catholic Church 127 (Doubleday, 1990) (quoting Paedagogus II, 33, 2.).
68 Id at 194.
69 Bullough, The Subordinate Sex at 84 (cited in note 35).
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During much of Christian history, all sexual intercourse, even
within marriage, was tainted. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas re-
garded original sin as transmitted via sexual intercourse (even
when unaccompanied by pleasure).70 For centuries, active sexuality
ranked inferior to celibacy, and often was regarded as sinful even
within marriage.71 For example, Augustine regarded any married
person who requested sex for pleasure, rather than procreation, as
committing a venial sin.72
The equation of women with sexuality and sexuality with im-
purity and sin remains strong in Roman Catholicism, with its all-
male celibate clergy and its rejection of contraception (which per-
mits sex for pleasure). Most other Christian denominations permit
clergy to marry, regard the married life as consistent with holiness,
and permit contraception. But traces of the equation of women
with sex and sex with sin persist. For example, most Christian de-
nominations still insist on a belief in the Virgin Birth. The Virgin
Birth distances ordinary women from the Christian ideal: ordinary
reproduction and mothering are tainted. If Mary is "pure" because
she never had sex, all other mothers are impure because they did.
Again, religious doctrine offers different things to women and men.
In the areas of sexuality and reproduction, religion stresses female
impurity and male creative power.
6. Christian sin and virtue.
Christianity defines as sin what is most likely to be the sin of
men: putting one's own development and needs ahead of others. It
defines as virtue self-sacrificing love. 73 But self-sacrifice is often
women's sin. Christianity thus encourages women to do what soci-
ety encourages them to do as caretakers and nurturers: hide their
own talents and find fulfillment vicariously through service to the
talents of others. This very sacrifice tends to be the sin of women,
who are too likely to dissipate themselves "in activities which are
merely trivial" in the service of others.74 A woman's greatest temp-
70 Ranke-Heinemann, Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven at 192-93 (cited in note 67).
,1 Id at 27-28.
72 Id at 95.
7 There is only one gospel parable about failing to develop one's talents. See Matthew
25:14-30 (New English Bible). In contrast, the gospels are full of verses on the need for
humility. Christian churches continue to define sin primarily as pride rather than hiding.
7' Valerie Saiving, The Human Situation: A Feminine View, in Carol P. Christ and
Judith Plaskow, eds, Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion 25, 38 (Harper &
Row, 1979). Keller carries this insight further, noting that "God the Father" is the embodi-
ment of Christian (male) sin. See Keller, From a Broken Web at 38-40 (cited in note 45).
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tation is to hide her talents rather than develop them, sacrificing
her development as an autonomous self in order to serve others. A
woman who does this is:
guilty of the sin of hiding; inasmuch as she has poured herself
into vicarious living, inasmuch as she has denied her sense of
self in total submission to husband/father/boss or in total self-
giving to children, job, or family, she has been guilty of the sin
of hiding. As she has been afraid to dream a dream for herself
as well as for others, and as she has trained herself to live a
submerged existence, she has hidden from her full humanity.75
Thus, the dominant conceptions of both Christian virtue and
sin discourage women from developing as autonomous beings. Fo-
cusing on men's sin as the sin and extolling women's sin as virtue
is a likely result of male domination of a religious tradition. Theol-
ogy, like theory, is in large part autobiography. For most men,
Christianity has correctly identified sin and virtue. Following
Christian teaching helps men to become better people. But men
have neither the insight nor any incentive to define women's sin in
a way that will encourage women to become more self-interested.
Instead, men define sin in a way that encourages women to sin
rather than to work against their real temptations. It is possible to
have it both ways; Christianity could give equal emphasis to both
women's sin (hiding) and men's sin (pride), stressing the need to
avoid both. Had women participated equally as leaders in Christi-
anity, it is likely that Christianity would do so rather than perpet-
uate "woman's bondage to her hiddenness. ' ' 76 To reiterate my ma-
jor point, religion does not mean for women what it means for
men.
7. Christianity and traditional roles for women: Mary the
mother.
Mainstream Christian religions present, as ideal, traditional
images of women as caretakers, nurturers, servants of others.77
Mary, the most prominent woman, is the most traditional and sub-
missive of women: "I am the Lord's servant; as you have spoken, so
See also Susan Nelson Dunfee, The Sin of Hiding: A Feminist Critique of Reinhold
Niehbuhr's Account of the Sin of Pride, 65 Soundings 316 (1982).
" Dunfee, 65 Soundings at 321-22 (cited in note 74).
7 Id at 322.
7 See, for example, Jerome L. Himmelstein, The Social Basis of Antifeminism: Reli-
gious Networks and Culture, 25 J Scientific Study Religion 1, 8 (1986).
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be it."' ' In contrast to the portrayal of women in a singular tradi-
tional role, men are seen in many roles: God, savior, prophet, reli-
gious leader, father, etc. Again religion offers different things to
men and women. It offers men a greater range of more powerful
roles.
These problems in mainstream religions, particularly Christian
religions, are deeply embedded in religious belief and practice.
These religions cannot eliminate the sexism easily; the use of gen-
der-neutral language will not eradicate deeper problems. A number
of commentators consider America's religious traditions "to be our
most deep-seated cause of patriarchy." 9 Nevertheless, religion has
been and is a positive influence in many women's lives. It is a
source of meaning for women more than for men, despite its patri-
archal nature. I next consider the positive aspects of the complex
relationship between women and religion. This exploration bal-
ances my critical discussion of religion. It does not, however, de-
tract from my main point. Religious freedom has not given women
and men the same ability to develop an extra-governmental au-
thority for meaning, values, and morality.
B. Religion as a Positive Force in Women's Lives
In this Section, I discuss two positive aspects of religion for
women. First, I explore ways in which religion has empowered
women. Second, I explore ways in which religion has been affected
by and reflects women's beliefs and values.
1. Religion often empowers women.
Throughout history, religion has been a source of power for
individual women. Like men, many women, from Joan of Arc to
African American women preachers in the nineteenth century, 0
have found an authority in religion to support unconventional
choices. Religious activities and organizations offered women
" Luke 1:38 (New English Bible) (Mary's reply to the angel Gabriel when informed
that she will have a son, though she is a virgin).
"8 Anne Barstow Driver, Religion, 2 Signs 434, 434 (1976) (review essay). See also, for
example, John Wilson, Religion in American Society: The Effective Presence 264 (Prentice
Hall, 1978) ("Religion is probably the single most important shaper of sex roles."); Himmel-
stein, 25 J Scientific Study Religion at 7-12 (cited in note 77).
"0 For the stories of some of the latter, see, for example, Bert James Loewenberg and
Ruth Bogin, eds, Black Women in Nineteenth-Century American Life (Penn State, 1976);
William L. Andrews, ed, Sisters of the Spirit: Three Black Women's Autobiographies of the
Nineteenth Century (Indiana, 1986); Jean McMahon Humez, ed, Gifts of Power: The Writ-
ings of Rebecca Jackson, Black Visionary, Shaker Eldress (Massachusetts, 1981).
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meaningful and respectable work in public life when many women
were otherwise relegated to their homes. Women in religious orders
received educations and achieved independence denied to most
women. Activists in the suffrage and abolition movements first or-
ganized and pushed for change through their churches.8' Some reli-
gious groups, particularly Quakers, produced exceptionally high
numbers of women leaders.2 During the nineteenth century,
women used movements with religious overtones and membership,
such as the temperance, voluntary motherhood, and social purity
movements, to try to better the condition of women in a variety of
ways. 3 Although many of these women used religious networks
and ideals in their organizing, they were rarely religious leaders as
such. Their ability to restructure religious belief and practice was
therefore limited.
Religion continues to play a positive role in the lives of many
women today. Most religious Christian women today, and more
women than men, regard their religious commitment as a positive
experience.8 4 In the next Section, I explore some of the reasons
why Christianity, despite and even because of its sexism, appeals
disproportionately to women.8
5
2. Religion reflects women's traditional roles and values.
Religious values are, in many ways, more consistent with
women's roles than men's. A man's duty to support his family by
succeeding in the competitive world of a market economy conflicts
81 See, for example, Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Move-
ment in the United States (Harvard, rev ed 1975); Marjorie Wall Bingham, Women and the
Constitution: Student Textbook 23-24 (Communicorp, 1990); Nancy A. Hewitt, Women's
Activism and Social Change: Rochester, New York, 1822-1872 43-44 (Cornell, 1984).
82 Bingham, Women and the Constitution at 22-24 (cited in note 81).
83 See, for example, Linda Gordon, Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History
of Birth Control in America 116-20, 131-32 (Penguin, 1977); Elizabeth B. Clark, Religion
and Rights Consciousness in the Antebellum Woman's Rights Movement, in Martha Al-
bertson Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen, eds, At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism
and Legal Theory 188 (Routledge, 1991); Carolyn De Swarte Gifford, Women in Social Re-
form Movements, in Rosemary Radford Ruether and Rosemary Skinner Keller, eds, 1
Women and Religion in America: The Nineteenth Century 294 (Harper & Row, 1981);
Nancy F. Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood. "Woman's Sphere" in New England, 1780-1835
149-54 (Yale, 1977).
84 Robert Wuthnow and William Lehrman, Religion: Inhibitor or Facilitator of Politi-
cal Involvement Among Women?, in Louise A. Tilly and Patricia Gurin, eds, Women, Polit-
ics, and Change 300, 302 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1990). Indeed, "[w]omen are 18 points
more likely than men to say that their religious commitment has been a positive experi-
ence." Id.
85 Jews are as likely to be men as women. See George Gallup, Jr., Religion in America
50 Years: 1935-1985, in The Gallup Report No 236 at 34 (1985).
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somewhat with the virtues of mainstream Christianity. Christianity
calls for humility, service to others, obedience to the laws of God
(rather than the market), generosity to the poor and unfortunate,
and forgiving and forgetting. These virtues better match women's
traditional roles as mothers, nurturers, and enablers responsible
for making home a "haven" from the heartless world of the
market.
I noted earlier that Christian sin is sin for men: pride and put-
ting oneself first. For women, real sin tends to be forgetting one's
own needs and living through others, the sin of "hiding," of failing
to use one's talents. Ironically, Christianity extols women's
sin-self-sacrifice and vicarious fulfillment-as the primary virtue.
But precisely because self-sacrifice is women's real sin, the Chris-
tian notions of sin and virtue resonate with women. Christianity
gives positive meaning to women's behavior as subordinates and
victims.
Women's culture and rules of conduct also identify and pro-
scribe the sin of pride. In her recent book, You Just Don't Under-
stand,86 Deborah Tannen studied the ways groups of girls and
groups of boys interact. For girls, interaction is about sharing feel-
ings and experiences, about empathy. Girls tend to consider it so-
cially inappropriate to put oneself forward as superior, to out-dis-
tance one's friends in any way. Unusual success is something one
apologizes for or explains away. Boys tend to see interaction as es-
sentially about establishing hierarchy, out-distancing one's friends
both in games and in other activities, using words to demonstrate
that because of one's success, one out-ranks another. Given these
differences, Christian sin will seem odd to boys, and out of touch
with reality. For girls, Christian sin resonates with their social
norms, which proscribe precisely the same thing as Christian sin.
In other words, Christian virtues of service and self-sacrifice reso-
nate deeply with girls' culture and with what girls are told they
should do in order to be good wives and mothers. They make less
sense for boys because they are inconsistent with boys' culture and
with the traditional breadwinner role in a rough-and-tumble mar-
ket economy. Thus, the appeal of Christianity is precisely its dan-
ger for women. Had more Christian theologians and preachers
been women, Christianity might give equal emphasis to women's
sin, and resonate with women's culture no more than with men's.
"e Deborah Tannen, You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation
(William Morrow, 1990).
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In Christianity, the evangelical emphasis on inner feelings and
the emotional cult of Jesus also appeals greatly to women. Evan-
gelical movements dominated Protestantism in America in the
nineteenth century and profoundly changed the content of all
mainstream Christian denominations, 7 shifting the devotional fo-
cus of many from a macho "God the Father" incapable of empathy
to a very feminine and empathetic Jesus. For many women, reli-
gion fills an important emotional void. Educated in heterosexual
romance, 8 but unable to find a satisfactory male lover, women find
in religion the romantic emotional union they long for and cannot
find in a relationship with a man.
The Christian emphasis on suffering, as exemplified by the
crucifixion, valorizes traditionally feminine masochism of the sort
Freud would recognize. In part, the appeal of Christianity to
women arises from its ability to give meaning to the suffering and
pain of their own lives; to give meaning to all suffering and
subordination.
Jewish traditions are feminine in another sense, one not
shared by most Christian sects: religious rituals in the home are of
great importance. Women are ultimately responsible for such ritu-
als. This emphasis sanctifies the space traditionally reserved for
women and gives significance to women's caretaking activities, es-
pecially as cooks and organizers of family holidays and rituals.
In addition, both Judaism and Christianity protect and sup-
port women in important ways. Both legitimate and value women's
traditional roles. Both developed economic protections for wives
and mothers. For example, canon law developed the obligations of
a husband, separated from wife and children, to pay alimony and
child support. These obligations became the basis of secular family
law's economic supports for divorced women. 9 Orthodox Judaism
provides a number of property protections for a divorced wife.e0 In
addition, the secular idea of equality-which has been important
8 See Claude Welch, 1 Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century: 1799-1870 22-
30 (Yale, 1972); Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood at 128-37 (cited in note 83). For another
view of Jesus as feminine, see Roberts, Religion in Sociological Perspective at 284 (cited in
note 34).
88 On the importance of romance to women, see, for example, Dorothy C. Holland and
Margaret A. Eisenhart, Educated in Romance: Women, Achievement and College Culture
(Chicago, 1990); Keller, From a Broken Web at 15-16 (cited in note 45).
88 See Mary Ann Glendon, State, Law and Family: Family Law in Transition in the
United States and Western Europe 312-13 (North-Holland, 1977).
90 See, for example, Daniel I. Leifer, On Writing New Ketubot, in Koltun, ed, The
Jewish Woman 50 (cited in note 55).
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in giving women a basis for arguing for social change-may have
its origins in Christian ideas and ideals.
Although many feminists have left patriarchal religions be-
cause of the difficulty of reconciling their beliefs about women with
traditional religious beliefs and practices, 91 many other women and
feminists work from within to make religions less sexist and more
responsive to, and reflective of, the human condition. Within Jew-
ish and Christian congregations, feminists are working in many
ways and on many levels to make religions more responsive to
women's needs. For example, feminists challenge the focus on the
male sin of pride in Christianity to include the female sin of "hid-
ing,"92 which is the "underdevelopment or negation of self."'9 3 Fem-
inists also bring insights to evangelical Christianity (including fun-
damentalist evangelical groups),9' Roman Catholicism,9 5 Judaism,9 6
and the study of early Christianity.9 7 This outpouring of feminist
insights and criticisms of mainstream religions indicates the deep
attachment many women feel toward religion, even when they see
its sexism.
The positive aspects of the relationship between women and
religion and women's deep attachment to religion do not negate my
central concern: religious freedom has not meant the same thing
for women and men. Indeed, this discussion has demonstrated the
close link between religion's appeal to women and its danger for
women. Religion values women's traditional roles, including subor-
dination and even suffering. Religion also offers emotional fulfill-
ment, rather than requiring women to find fulfillment through the
development of their abilities. Thus, religion reinforces women's
subordinate status. It does not, of course, have this effect for men,
who dominate both religion and society in general. In the next Sec-
tion, I explore the empirical literature on the effect of religion on
9, Wuthnow and Lehrman, Religion (cited in note 84).
92 See Dunfee, 65 Soundings 316 (cited in note 74). See notes 74-76 and accompanying
text.
9 Saiving, The Human Situation at 37 (cited in note 74). See also Keller, From a Bro-
ken Web at 12, 39-40, 190 (cited in note 45).
", See Judith Stacey, Brave New Families: Stories of Domestic Upheaval in Late
Twentieth Century America 139-46 (Basic, 1990) (reviewing writings of evangelical
feminists).
" See generally Anne E. Carr, Transforming Grace: Christian Tradition and Women's
Experience (Harper & Row, 1988); Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: To-
ward a Feminist Theology (Beacon, 1983).
'" See, for example, Koltun, ed, The Jewish Woman (cited in note 55).
97 See, for example, Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theo-
logical Reconstruction of Christian Origins (Crossroad, 1983).
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political issues important to women and on women's political
participation.
C. Empirical Evidence: Religion and Women
Religious Christians are more likely than other Americans to
take positions inconsistent with women's equality. Those who at-
tend Christian services frequently are more likely to oppose abor-
tion, the Equal Rights Amendment, paternity leave, affirmative ac-
tion quotas, government support of day care, women keeping their
birth name or using the title "Ms.," and allowing girls on boys'
sports teams.98 Indeed, Christian "church attendance is generally
more strongly related to [these] antifeminist beliefs than are edu-
cation, income, occupational status, class, age, residence, and most
other social traits."99 Findings like these have been replicated in
study after study.100
The evidence on the relationship between Jewish religious
commitment and attitudes toward women is ambiguous. Female
supporters of feminism are likely to have had parents who were
Jewish, atheist, or agnostic and are more likely to be Jewish, athe-
9 Himmelstein, 25 J Scientific Study Religion 1, 9-10 (cited in note 77). In another
study, Christian church attendance was found to be correlated with traditional answers to
two questions about the desirability of a traditional division of labor and power with women
taking the domestic, subordinate role, and with two traditional answers about the conse-
quences for children of maternal employment. Karen Oppenheim Mason and Yu-Hsia Lu,
Attitudes Toward Women's Familial Roles: Changes in the United States, 1977-1985, 2
Gender & Soc 39, 43, 49-51 (1988).
" Himmelstein, 25 J Scientific Study Religion at 13 (cited in note 77).
100 See id (looking at data amassed in a number of studies, including data from general
population surveys, and concluding that antifeminist attitudes are rooted in Christian reli-
gious networks); Merlin B. Brinkerhoff and Marlene M. MacKie, Religious Denominations'
Impact Upon Gender Attitudes: Some Methodological Implications, 25 Rev Religious Re-
search 365, 365 (1984) ("denomination, the typology, and attendance [at Christian religious
services] tend to be more strongly correlated to gender attitudes than age or education");
Ross K. Baker, Laurily K. Epstein and Rodney D. Forth, Matters of Life and Death: Social,
Political, and Religious Correlates of Attitudes on Abortion, 9 Amer Pol Q 89 (1981) (ap-
proval of abortion found to be "a function of intensity of religious adherence"); Mary Y.
Morgan, The Impact of Religion on Gender-Role Attitudes, 11 Psych Women Q 301 (1987)
(religious devoutness most important variable for predicting five measured dimensions of
gender-role attitudes); Carol Mueller and Thomas Dimieri, The Structure of Belief Systems
Among Contending ERA Activists, 60 Soc Forces 657, 664-65 (1982) (activist opponents of
state ERA in Massachusetts in 1975 were all members of a church or parish; most propo-
nents were not); Kent L. Tedin, Religious Preference and Pro/Anti Activism on the Equal
Rights Amendment Issue, 21 Pac Sociol Rev 55, 64 (1978) (study of activists involved in
state deliberations on national ERA in Texas in spring of 1975; anti-ERA activists tended to
belong to conservative denominations).
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ist, agnostic, or Unitarian themselves.' 1' But these studies con-
found secular Jewish people who identify with their ethnic heritage
and those who are religious. It is not clear whether religious Jews
are less sexist than religious Christians.0 2 Given the content of Or-
thodox belief and practice, 0 3 it is possible that at least some reli-
gious Jews possess more sexist views than secular Jews.
To be sure, there is some variation among Christian denomi-
nations with respect to issues important for women's equality.104
For example, researchers using 1980 data found that 85.7 percent
of Jews, 64.3 percent of Catholics, 59.8 percent of Fundamentalist
Protestants, 59.2 percent of other Protestants, and twenty-five per-
cent of Mormons supported the Equal Rights Amendment. 105 One
study of students at Utah State University demonstrated that
Mormon students have much less favorable attitudes toward non-
traditional roles for women than do other students. 06 Across
Christian denominations, however, researchers have "clearly, con-
,0, J.A. Dempewolff, Some Correlates of Feminism, 34 Psych Rep 671, 671 (1974). I
have not found studies examining various strands of Judaism to see if they differ on this
point. Even religious Jews may be relatively egalitarian as a result of stress on the Israeli
norm of sexual equality (which exists at least on the level of American rhetoric). See Andrea
Dworkin, Israel: Whose Country Is It Anyway?, Ms. 69, 73 (Sep/Oct 1990).
102 Of those who identified themselves as Jewish in a 1975 study, only 38% were mem-
bers of a synagogue and only 32% attended services. Steven M. Cohen, American Moder-
nity & Jewish Identity 56 (Tavistock, 1983). In 1989, Christians were 21-26% more likely to
attend service than Jews. See Tom W. Smith, Counting Flocks and Lost Sheep: Trends in
Religious Preference Since World War II, in GSS Social Change Rep No 26, 53, 55 (Na-
tional Opinion Research Center University of Chicago, 1991).
103 See notes 58, 64-65 and accompanying text.
,01 See Himmelstein, 25 J Scientific Study Religion at 7 (cited in note 77) ("Jews and
the unaffiliated are distinctly more liberal on both ERA and abortion than either Protes-
tants or Catholics. Protestants tend to be slightly more supportive of abortion and less sup-
portive of ERA than Catholics. Fundamentalist and conservative Protestants are more likely
to oppose both than are liberal protestants."). Himmelstein reviewed a number of popula-
tion studies. See also Brinkerhoff and MacKie, 25 Rev Religious Research at 374 (cited in
note 100) (some variation in gender attitudes found by Christian denomination: Mormons
and Pentecostals most traditional in terms of attitudes though in terms of division of house-
hold labor and family power, Mormons among most egalitarian); Val Burris, Who Opposed
the ERA? An Analysis of the Social Bases of Antifeminism, 64 Soc Sci Q 305, 308-10
(1983); Baker, Epstein, and Forth, 9 Amer Pol Q at 99 (cited in note 100) (denominational
variation only modest on approval of abortion; key factor found to be intensity of religious
adherence).
105 Burris, 64 Soc Sci Q at 309 (cited in note 104). See also Glenna Spitze and Joan
Huber, Effects of Anticipated Consequences on ERA Opinion, 63 Soc Sci Q 323, 326 (1982)
(national sample: Catholics, Jews, and those without a religious affiliation more favorable to
ERA than Protestants).
,' Moshe Hartman and Harriet Hartman, Sex-role Attitudes of Mormons vs. Non-
Mormons in Utah, 45 J Marriage & Family 897, 899 (1983).
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sistently"'107 found a strong correlation between church attendance
and opposition to the ERA 0 and abortion:10 9 "Religious involve-
ment has a conservative effect [on ERA and abortion attitudes] no
matter what the denomination or its doctrines (though the magni-
tude of the effect varies)." 110 Religious devoutness has greater pre-
dictive power with respect to five dimensions of gender-role atti-
tudes among women undergraduates than self esteem,
assertiveness, mother's education, or mother's employment. The
greater the woman's devoutness, the more traditional her notions
about sex roles."'
107 Himmelstein, 25 J Scientific Study Religion at 7 (cited in note 77).
108 See, for example, Burris, 64 Soc Sci Q at 309-10 (cited in note 104); Baker, Epstein,
and Forth, 9 Amer Pol Q at 99-101 (cited in note 100) (survey of New Jersey voters: opposi-
tion to ERA correlates with strength of religious attachment, regardless of whether respon-
dent Catholic or Protestant); Louis Bolce, Gerald De Maio, and Douglas Muzzio, ERA and
the Abortion Controversy: A Case of Dissonance Reduction, 67 Soc Sci Q 299, 306, 310
(1986) (Center for Political Studies National Election Study Data: traditionalist early sup-
porters of ERA reversed positions as they experienced cognitive dissonance; white religious
people especially likely to switch from pro-ERA to anti-ERA); David W. Brady and Kent L.
Tedin, Ladies in Pink: Religion & Political Ideology in the Anti-ERA Movement, 56 Soc
Sci Q 564, 575 (1976) (study of anti-ERA activists in Texas: 98% church members; 66%
Fundamentalist Protestant; 25% other Protestant; 92% religion very important).
There are feminist reasons why one might oppose the ERA. See generally Becker, 1987
S Ct Rev at 214-24, 215 n 49 (cited in note 16). The empirical research consistently finds a
correlation between religious commitment and, not just opposition to the ERA, but more
generally opposition to change in women's roles and status. See notes 98-116 and accompa-
nying text. In fact, the states that refused to ratify the ERA werb states in which women
were generally worse off than the states in which the ERA was ratified. See David C. Nice,
State Opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment: Protectionism, Subordination, or Priva-
tization, 67 Soc Sci Q 315, 324-25 (1986) (states supporting ERA had lower divorce rates;
better AFDC benefit levels; better control of domestic violence; were less likely to have
women on death row; were less likely to have called for banning abortion; were less likely to
have required school segregation). This suggests that opposition was not grounded on a
commitment to women's welfare, but an opposition to increased status for women. Id at
326-27.
109 See, for example, Baker, Epstein, and Forth, 9 Amer Pol Q at 99-100 (cited in note
100) (survey of New Jersey voters: opposition to abortion correlates with strength of reli-
gious attachment, rather than with being a Catholic or Protestant); Sharon Marmon and
Howard A. Palley, The Decade After Roe Versus Wade: Ideology, Political Cleavage, and
the Policy Process, in Gwen Moore and Glenna Spitze, eds, 2 Research in Politics and Soci-
ety: Women and Politics: Activism, Attitudes, and Office-Holding 181, 194 (1986) ("Among
Catholics and Protestants who are frequent and regular churchgoers, church attendance
strongly correlates with opposition to abortion on demand, a correlation which is considera-
bly stronger with respect to Catholics than to Protestants.").
"o Himmelstein, 25 J Scientific Study Religion at 8 (cited in note 77). This author
notes that "differences are more marked for Catholicism than for Protestants and for the
more conservative protestants than the less conservative ones, but they are present across
the board." Id at 7.
" Morgan, 11 Psych Women Q at 305-06 (cited in note 100). Morgan measured five
gender-role attitudes:
Women's Wrongs
Interestingly, the correlation between Christian religious com-
mitment and sexist attitudes contrasts with the relationship be-
tween such commitment and racist attitudes. Although moderately
active Christians are, on the average, more racist than those who
do not attend church, the most committed church members are as
tolerant of racial minorities as non-members." 2 By contrast,
church members are more sexist than the nonaffiliated, and the
most committed churchmembers are the most sexist."'
The reader may object that religious activities (or perhaps
Christian religious activities) do not "cause" antifeminist or other
political attitudes or acceptance of traditional women's roles.
Rather, those with traditional attitudes are more likely to be mem-
bers of religious groups, especially conservative religious groups.
Thus, self selection explains the correlation between religious in-
volvement and antifeminist beliefs.
But children are not born with either sex-role attitudes or reli-
gious commitments. Rather, they are socialized within religious
communities and by parents with certain beliefs. There is a high
correlation between one's religious training as a child and one's re-
ligious commitment as an adult. For example, ninety-one percent
of those "raised as Baptists say they are Baptists today.""' 4 For
Episcopalians, the figure is ninety percent; for Lutherans, eighty-
nine percent; for Methodists, seventy-four percent; for Presbyteri-
ans, seventy-two percent; for Catholics, eighty-one percent; for
Jews, eighty-six percent; for those with no religion, forty-four per-
cent.115 The fact that parents so successfully socialize their chil-
(a) familial roles, i.e., mothers' and fathers' roles pertaining to household division of
labor and care of children; (b) extrafamilial roles, i.e., roles of men and women regard-
ing career commitment, decisionmaking, and leadership ability; (c) male/female stereo-
types, i.e., beliefs about the innate characteristics of men and women such as male
superiority and female dependency; (d) social change as related to sex roles, i.e.,
changes in social structure necessary for equality in male/female roles such as equal
pay and equal job opportunities ... ; and [(e)] gender-role preferences for role of wife,
i.e., the role of a woman in relationship to her husband when she is working outside the
home.
Id at 302 (citations omitted).
112 Richard L. Gorsuch and Daniel Aleshire, Christian Faith and Ethnic Prejudice: A
Review and Interpretation of Research, 13 J Scientific Study Religion 281, 285 (1974). "The
more intrinsically religious, nonfundamentalistic, and theologically discriminating persons
were also more tolerant." Id at 281. See also Keith A. Roberts, Religion in Sociological
Perspective 261-79 (Wadsworth, 2d ed 1990).
113 Roberts, Religion in Sociological Perspective at 280-300 (cited in note 112).
14 Public Opinion Report: America: Land of the Faithful 96, 101 n (American Enter-
prise, 1990).
11 Id (again, the figure for Jews would include both religious and secular Jews). I am
not asserting that adults never choose religion. Fifty-six percent of those raised without
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dren into their religion means that we cannot regard correlations
between sexist attitudes and religious beliefs as the result of self-
selection by autonomous adults. To the extent religious beliefs cor-
relate with antifeminist beliefs, sexual equality for younger genera-
tions conflicts with religious freedom for older generations.1 '
Further, to the extent "autonomous" adults do chose religion,
the correlation between church devotion and antifeminist political
views should be troubling because of the unavailability of any non-
sexist religious tradition in the American mainstream. Adults have
only a limited set of options-a set that does not include any tradi-
tion in which women have been leaders in appropriate levels for
any period of time (let alone the millenia over which mainstream
religious traditions have developed). If a nonsexist religion were
part of the American mainstream, we would live in a culture rather
different from the present one, and "autonomous" adults in that
culture would likely make quite different choices from those made
by "autonomous" adults in this culture. That people choose from
the options available to them cannot justify the range of options.
The studies already cited suggest that mainstream Christian
religions contribute to women's subordinate status in society at
large: churchgoers are more likely to take antifeminist positions on
political issues important to women." 7 Mainstream Christian reli-
gions also impede women's success as politicians. Researchers have
found a negative correlation between fundamentalist membership
within a state and female representation in the state legislature."18
A study of female candidates running for state and national office
from New York city and two neighboring counties found Catholic
women underrepresented and Jewish women overrepresented." 9
Churches also engage directly in politics. Protestant and Cath-
olic organizations are often used to rally opposition to feminist is-
religion nevertheless have a religious affiliation as adults. My point is that particular reli-
gious beliefs are passed on from one generation to the next; one cannot, therefore, assert
that religious beliefs are the result of choice by "autonomous" adults. If all children were
raised without religion, fewer would be associated with religious organizations as adults (and
more would be feminists as adults).
118 Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 241-46 (1972) (Douglas dissenting in part) (pointing
out that religious freedom of high school-age Amish children may conflict with their parents'
religious freedom).
117 See text accompanying notes 98-111.
"8 See, for example, Thomas J. Bolgy, John E. Schwarz, and Hildy Gottlieb, Female
Representation and the Quest for Resources: Feminist Activism and Electoral Success, 67
Soc Sci Q 156, 161 (1986).
I'l Nikki R. Van Hightower, The Recruitment of Women for Public Office, 5 Amer Pol
Q 301, 311 (1977).
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sues, and thereby have a very direct impact on politics.12 ° Catholic
prelates have been more willing to criticize female Catholic politi-
cians (as compared to men) for failing to follow official doctrine."'
Yet many Protestant and Catholic organizations enjoy significant
tax and postage advantages over women's political organizations
such as NOW PAC.
The empirical work on religion and women examined in this
Section shows that religion is a political problem for women. Chris-
tian religious values support the sexual status quo. Christians dis-
proportionately favor antifeminist positions. In part, this is be-
cause sexism pervades religious doctrines and practices in content
and effect. In part it is because religious organizations are political
actors and are led by men. In the next subsection, I examine the
extent to which government subsidizes religion despite its an-
tidemocratic effects.
D. Government Support for Religion
In the United States, we have neither separation of church
and state nor state neutrality toward religion. Rather, the govern-
ment contributes significantly to religions. I briefly give three ex-
amples: 1) Lynch v Donnelly 2' ("the creche case"); 2) tax and
postage advantages; and 3) income tax-free housing subsidies for
"ministers of the gospel." In each of these examples, the govern-
mental subsidy is troubling for two reasons. The first is a general
objection: subsidies to mainstream religions contribute to women's
subordinate status generally and within the political system. The
second is an objection to more specific practices. In the creche
case, the government subsidized a sexist image. In the case of tax
and postal subsidies, religions, which mobilize opposition to femi-
nist issues, receive benefits denied women's political organizations.
And housing subsidies reinforce and magnify discriminatory em-
ployment practices within religious organizations.
The reader may object that the Bill of Rights does not cause
the problems in these three areas: it does not mandate the display
of sexist imagery on government property, require tax exemptions
from generally applicable taxes, or require housing subsidies. In-
120 See, for example, Kenneth D. Wald, Dennis E. Owen, and Samuel S. Hill, Jr.,
Churches as Political Communities, 82 Amer Pol Sci Rev 531, 533-34 (1988); Himmelstein,
25 J Scientific Study Religion at 8 (cited in note 77).
1' See, for example, Geraldine A. Ferraro with Linda Bird Francke, Ferraro: My Story
222 (Bantam, 1985).
122 465 US 668 (1984).
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deed, the housing subsidy may be unconstitutional under the Es-
tablishment Clause. 2 ' My point is that, except for the housing
subsidy, the Bill of Rights does not prohibit these subsidies. When
they are held unconstitutional, as in the housing subsidy case, it is
not because they discriminate against women. Indeed, the conflict
between religious freedom and equality for women is not even visi-
ble in the literature or caselaw of the First Amendment.
1. Lynch, v Donnelly.
In Lynch v Donnelly the Supreme Court held that the Estab-
lishment Clause does not prohibit a merchants' association in Paw-
tucket, Rhode Island, from erecting a creche (along with a number
of other symbols, including a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear)
in a public park.14  This governmental subsidy for reli-
gion-allowing public property to be used for the display of reli-
gious symbols-is not neutral with respect to sex for two reasons.
First, most religion is patriarchal and governmental subsidies of
religion will, therefore, reinforce patriarchal traditions. Second, an
image of the Holy Family displayed on government property raises
a more particular set of problems.
The relationship between Mary and Jesus embodies a male
fantasy of the ideal mother-son relationship. Jesus is more impor-
tant; he is the son of God. Mary, as a mere mortal, exists to serve
him. Jesus will grow to be a powerful and active male with an im-
portant mission. Mary plays only a passive supporting role. The
birth of Jesus had nothing to do with his mother's sexual pleasure
or even sexuality. The reproductive agency of "God the Father"
overshadows the reality of female reproductive power.' 25 Admit-
tedly, the virgin Mary is a positive female image-it might be
worse to have no women at all. Moreover, both men and women
are supposed to emulate the ideal of submission to the will of God.
But, as noted earlier, the message of submission to God's will ad-
dresses men's sin (pride) more than women's sin (passivity) and
Mary's virginity is a denial of female sexuality and reproductive
power. 26 This message is a barrier to women's equality and effec-
123 See note 134 and accompanying text.
124 465 US at 685. The Court has subsequently held that a creche not surrounded by
animals or other secular symbols cannot be constitutionally placed on government property.
County of Allegheny v ACLU, 492 US 573, 621 (1989).
12' See, for example, Daly, Gyn/Ecology at 83 (cited in note 39).
12' See text accompanying notes 73-74, especially Saiving, The Human Situation (cited
in note 74).
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tive political participation because it reinforces men's superior sta-
tus and political dominance. 27
Of course, the sexism in the imagery of the creche is likely to
have only trivial consequences, compared with much more harmful
sexist imagery, such as pornography and advertising aimed at sell-
ing clothes or beauty products to women by making women feel
inadequate. For this reason, I would not recommend excluding
such religious symbols from government property because of the
harm they cause to women. But the sexism in such symbols should
not remain invisible in legal analysis. And perhaps such sexism
should justify compensatory "affirmative" action.
2. Tax and postage breaks for religious organizations.
Although religious organizations and feminist political organi-
zations both act politically on issues important to women, such as
abortion, they do not receive equal treatment in terms of either
taxes or postage rates. The Constitution permits the government to
subsidize antifeminist religious organizations yet deny equal treat-
ment to feminist political organizations.
To illustrate this point, I compare the treatment of the Catho-
lic Church, a politically active religious organization, and the treat-
ment of a feminist political action organization, NOW PAC. The
government treats these two organizations similarly in terms of in-
come tax on organizational income: both are exempt, since NOW
PAC is a nonprofit organization. 2 " But all states exempt the Cath-
olic Church from paying property taxes for churches.'29 Many
states exempt all church-owned property used exclusively for reli-
gious purposes. 130 Most states exempt the Catholic Church from
127 See Section I.B.2.
228 26 USC § 527(a).
'9 Richard R. Hammar, Pastor, Church & Law 378 (Gospel Publishing, 1983). In order
to qualify for federal income tax exemptions, a religious corporation must not intervene or
participate directly in political campaigns at all (i.e., it cannot support or oppose specific
candidates). Id at 340-41. Nor is the organization allowed to undertake "substantial efforts
to influence legislation." Id at 336-40. There is no bright line for determining when such
efforts are substantial. Id. The Catholic Church has never lost its tax exempt status despite
the fact that it teaches a position on abortion inconsistent with legislation allowing women
to choose and despite the use of church networks and events to rally opposition to abortion
rights. Nor did the Catholic Church lose its status when prelates attacked Geraldine Ferraro
because of her position on abortion. See Ferraro, My Story at 211-39 (cited in note 121).
130 Hammar, Pastor, Church & Law at 378 (cited in note 129). Others exempt parson-
ages in addition to churches. Id.
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sales taxes, use taxes, and personal property taxes as well.' 3'NOW
PAC must pay these taxes. Contributors to the Catholic Church
can deduct their contributions from income in calculating income
tax. 1 32 Contributors to NOW PAC cannot. The Catholic Church
can take advantage of subsidized mail rates which are unavailable
to NOW PAC." 3
Subsidies to mostly patriarchal religions are not gender neu-
tral in two obvious respects. First, they are equivalent to taxpayer
funding of sexist institutions. Second, these subsidies have political
effects that are detrimental to women.
3. Income tax treatment of housing for "ministers of gospel."
The Internal Revenue Code permits a "minister of the gospel"
to exclude housing costs or a housing allowance from income for
tax purposes.13 As interpreted by the courts and the IRS, this ex-
emption is available only to ordained ministers and those holding
equivalent positions in congregations without ordained clergy."35
Like other governmental subsidies of religion, this policy is
troubling on two levels. First, it subsidizes only institutions that
are mostly patriarchal because it subsidizes only religious workers
and not other people. Second, because of the specifics of the provi-
sion, it magnifies traditional discrimination by religious groups
with respect to leadership positions, giving the benefit only to
those religious workers who are likely to be male: people who are
either ordained ministers or the functional equivalent."' Women's
traditional roles in congregations-as teachers, support staff,
etc.-do not qualify under this provision, even when the women
are full-time employees." 7 Although this provision of the federal
31 See Texas Monthly, Inc. v Bullock, 489 US 1, 29, 30 n 2, 32 n 3 (1989) (Scalia
dissenting) (lists many state exemptions from sales and use taxes). The majority struck
down a Texas exemption from sales and use taxes that applied only to religious periodicals
and not to "similar" charitable or educational organizations. Id at 25.
.3 26 USC § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).
... See 39 USC § 3626 (1991). Second and third class rates are available at a discount to
religious, educational, scientific, philanthropic, agricultural, labor, veterans, and fraternal
organizations if they are nonprofit and meet other requirements. 39 USC § 3626(a)(1) (1991)
(incorporating former code sections 39 USC §§ 4358, 4359, 4421, 4422, 4452, and 4554).
Qualified political committees may also mail at the discounted third class rates, but must be
part of a political party. See 39 USC §§ 3626(e)(1) and 3626(2)(A). NOW PAC would not
qualify, nor would any other women's organization since no women's political party exists.
"' 26 USC § 107.
'3' See IRS Rev Rule 78-301 (Jewish cantor qualified as "minister of the gospel").
136 Treas Reg § 1.107-1(a).
... IRS Private Letter Ruling 8614010 (unordained teachers did not qualify).
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tax code is probably vulnerable to constitutional challenge in light
of a 1989 Supreme Court case holding that a tax exemption appli-
cable only to religious activities is unconstitutional,13 8 it remains in
effect. And if the Court does overrule it, I doubt that discrimina-
tion against women religious workers will inform the decision.
There are no estimates of the total taxpayer subsidies for reli-
gious organizations through postage and tax breaks including the
housing exemption, but the amount is quite large. One recent case
involved over $100,000 in sales taxes imposed on the Jimmy Swag-
gart Ministries' sales of religious materials through the mail over a
period of about eight years in a single state.13 9 In fiscal year 1985,
Congress appropriated $723.6 million to subsidize postage for qual-
ifying organizations; about forty-five percent of the qualifying or-
ganizations were religious.140 Total annual government subsidies to
religious organizations in the United States as a result of exemp-
tions and direct subsidies must be well in the billions.
I have discussed three ways in which government supports
mostly patriarchal religions: through the display of religious sym-
bols on government property; through tax and postage breaks for
religious organizations; and through exemptions from income tax
for housing allowances for ministers of the gospel. This is not, of
course, an exhaustive list. Myriad federal and state laws and poli-
cies support religion. I mention two others briefly as illustrations of
the breadth of the problem, though many more exist. First, govern-
ments routinely hire religious organizations to perform governmen-
tal services, such as caring for abused or neglected families and
children, sometimes in religious institutions.' Second, the Su-
preme Court has permitted federal funding of religious counseling
programs on teenage sexuality, 42 though such programs reflect re-
ligious organizations' sexist attitudes toward sexuality, especially
those of the Catholic Church.
138 Texas Monthly, 489 US at 25.
131 See Brief for Appellant 8-9, The Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v Board of Equaliza-
tion of California S Ct No 88-1374, 493 US 378 (1990).
14 See Richard Kielbowicz and Linda Lawson, Reduced-Rate Postage for Nonprofit
Organizations: A Policy History, Critique, and Proposal, 11 Harv J L & Pub Pol 347, 398-
99 (1988).
"I See, for example, Catholic Agency to Operate Youth Shelter, Chi Trib 3 (May 13,
1988) (describing temporary shelter and more permanent institution for abused or delin-
quent children to be run by Catholic Charities); State Seeks to Overhaul its Shelters, Chi
Trib 5 (Jul 28, 1989) (describing a child intake center for young neglected or abused chil-
dren run by Catholic Charities: Columbus-Maryville Reception Center).
142 Bowen v Kendrick, 487 US 589, 621 (1988).
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True, government receives services in exchange under these
kinds of programs, but hiring sexist religious organizations to per-
form governmental functions is not sex-neutral. Such contracts
support religion and increase its power. Indeed, such programs
often give governmental power as well as money to religion.
In this Section, I have discussed both the positive and nega-
tive aspects of mainstream religion for women and the relevant
empirical evidence. As I stressed in the Introduction, my major
point is purely critical: the religion clauses of the First Amendment
do not have the same meaning for women and men. These clauses
have not empowered women as much as men to develop an autono-
mous source of authority, meaning, value, and morality indepen-
dent of the state. Instead, these clauses shield from state regula-
tion deeply patriarchal institutions which impede women's political
effectiveness in a democracy. Indeed, the Religion Clauses, at least
as currently interpreted, allow the government to magnify the sub-
ordinating effects of religion by subsidizing it and giving govern-
mental power to religious activities. There has been too little ap-
preciation of this point in the legal literature. I know of no other
discussion of this point, though there is some appreciation of the
conflict between religious freedom for parents and children's inter-
ests in education or health care. 14 3
We cannot expect the Bill of Rights to establish all the social
rights women need. I do, however, suggest a change that we could
implement by interpretation or amendment. In interpreting the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court could hold unconsti-
titutional tax subsidies, tax exemptions, or the award of govern-
ment contracts to religions that discriminate overtly and admit-
tedly on the basis of sex in hiring leaders.
On this view, the Constitution compels a Bob Jones approach
to religions that discriminate on the basis of sex in leadership posi-
tions. In Bob Jones, the IRS denied charity status to a religious
university that discriminated on the basis of race.' The religious
university prohibited interracial dating because the religion disap-
proved of interracial marriage. The Supreme Court held that the
denial of charity status to such an institution was statutorily per-
missible. The case is understood to indicate that the Supreme
"' See, for example, Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 242-46 (1972) (Douglas dissent-
ing) (pointing out that religious freedom of high school-age children may conflict with their
parents' religious freedom); In re Eric B. v Ted B., 189 Cal App 3d 996, 1008-09 (1987)
(blood transfusion ordered for child whose parents' religion would not permit it).
... Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574, 604-05 (1983).
[59:453
Women's Wrongs
Court does not regard the IRS interpretation of the statute as un-
constitutional. If the Court had regarded the IRS interpretation as
unconstitutional, it would have interpreted the statute to avoid the
constitutional problem. Thus, a denial of a benefit to a religious
organization that admittedly and overtly discriminates on the basis
of race does not violate either of the Religion Clauses.
The Constitution may compel this approach in the context of
race. The grant of a tax advantage to a racist university is state
action. And in both Shelly v Kraemer,14 5 involving government en-
forcement of a racially exclusionary covenant, and Burton v Wil-
mington Parking Authority,'46 involving the government's grant of
a lease to a racially discriminatory restaurant, the Supreme Court
held that similar private racial discrimination was impermissible
when accompanied by similar state action. 14 7
This approach could and should extend to banning tax exemp-
tions and postal subsidies and the award of government contracts
to religious organizations that close leadership positions to women.
Like anti-miscegenation policies (Bob Jones), and segregation in
housing (Shelley) and in places of public accomodation such as
restaurants (Burton), keeping women out of leadership positions
denies women the opportunity to participate in society as equals.
Keeping women out of religious leadership positions precludes a
necessary prerequisite for religious freedom to mean as much to
women as to men. For example, the sexist imagery of the creche,
whether on government property or elsewhere, is less likely to
change if women are not religious leaders. At the same time, deny-
ing benefits to religions that overtly close leadership positions to
women would not involve greater governmental entanglement with
religion than denying benefits to religious universities with anti-
miscegenation policies. Under this interpretation, the Constitution
would prohibit benefits only to religions or religious institutions
which overtly and admittedly deny women religious autonomy and
free exercise.
Thus, the Court could regard a Bob Jones approach as consti-
tutionally compelled when religions close leadership positions to
women. Grants of tax exemptions or subsidies or government con-
tracts to such organizations are state action and the state cannot
discriminate on the basis of sex without an exceedingly strong jus-
tification. Religious liberty cannot justify the exemption, since
X45 334 US 1 (1948).
', 365 US 715 (1961).
Shelley, 334 US at 23; Burton, 365 US at 726.
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these organizations deny women the religious liberty they offer
men. To be sure, denial of such subsidies will "hurt" religions that
close leadership to women just as the denial of tax exempt status
hurt Bob Jones University.148 Our unwillingness to take action
with respect to this blatant sex discrimination reflects our priori-
ties. At present, religious freedom for some men and women justi-
fies affirmative support for institutions subordinating women and
denying women full religious freedom. At the very least, we should
rethink our decision to foster such institutions.
We could modify the Constitution to proscribe religious subsi-
dies altogether, or even to require state regulation of religion to
eliminate sexism. I would not, however, favor these approaches. I
think that all people need sources of authority outside government.
Too much government control would preclude the ability of reli-
gion to perform that function. My only suggested change in this
area is, therefore, exceedingly moderate.
II. FREE SPEECH AND PRESS
Amendment I to the Constitution guarantees "freedom of
speech" and freedom "of the press."14 9 In a society with a mass
culture, where institutions of the "press" wield immense power,
the freedom of the press assumes particular importance. The First
Amendment views the "press" (television, movies, videos, books,
video games) as largely beyond the reach of government regulation.
Yet the "press," particularly its most powerful organ, television,
impedes the democratic functioning of our political system. I dis-
cuss this problem in terms of both race and sex. 5' In addition, a
"free" market in speech means that the market, governed by abil-
ity to pay, determines who can speak.
Although white men are a minority in this country, television
presents a world in which white men are the majority of the popu-
1'8 For an argument that distinguishing between religions that overtly discriminate and
those that do not is a violation of the Establishment Clause (and Bob Jones was therefore
wrongly decided), see Miles, 8 Harv Women's L J 31 (cited in note 30) (arguing that all
subsidies to religions should therefore end).
149 US Const, Amend I.
o In each case, there can be no absolutely firm evidence of causation. For example,
correlations are always ambiguous since television viewing may not cause the observed trait
but rather be related to other factors that cause both the observed trait and television view-
ing. I assume, for this discussion, that television does influence viewers' attitudes, especially
the attitudes of young viewers.
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lation as well as socially dominant.15 ' As one group of researchers
expressed it, "[t]he prominent and stable overrepresentation of
well-to-do white males in the prime of life dominates prime
time."'1 52 In 1989, only twenty-nine percent of the leads in feature
films were for actresses. And a number of those parts were prosti-
tutes, though prostitutes are a very small part of the population of
women.' 5 3 Minorities and women rarely appear as authorities on
television.15 4 When women do appear as authorities, they fre-
quently espouse positions regarded as anti-women. 5 Television
and films about caretaking portray men more often than women in
the lead caretaking roles, contributing to the invisibility and un-
dervalvation of women as caregivers. 5 s
Media sports pervade American culture, and almost all sports
heroes are male. Women's team sports do not receive national tele-
vision coverage. When women do appear in popular sports events,
such as Olympic gymnastics or ice skating, aesthetics-watching
the female body in motion in a revealing costume-dominate. Even
women tennis stars (the most visible non-Olympic women athletes
in the national media) are held to an aesthetic standard more de-
manding, especially with respect to weight, than that applied to
men.
157
The visual media (film, television, magazines) inevitably stress
appearance. But for women, the standard of beauty is both more
demanding and of more singular importance than for men. In part,
this is because women are more often defined as sex objects. Even
when not presented solely as sex objects (for example, when por-
trayed as a business person with a briefcase in a credit card adver-
tisement), women are almost always young and beautiful. The
15, See, for example, Matilda Butler and William Paisley, Women and the Mass Media:
Sourcebook for Research and Action 78 (Human Sciences, 1980) (reporting that in the thir-
teen studies of the relative appearance of women and men over a twenty year period, the
appearance of women became less frequent; overall, men were 72% of all characters and
women 28%; one study found that 79% of all white characters were men and 90% of all
black characters were men).
"I George Gerbner, et al, Charting the Mainstream: Television's Contributions to Po-
litical Orientations, 32 J Commun 100, 106 (1982).
"I' Gene Siskel, It's the Streep Mystique, Chi Trib Arts 4 (Sep 2, 1990).
114 For example, most voice overs in commercials are male voices. See Butler and Pais-
ley, Women and the Mass Media at 69-70 (cited in note 148).
, See Sunstein, 59 U Chi L Rev at 284 (cited in note 2).
'" See Judith Posner, Where's Mom? With more men in the kitchen, TV mothers fade
from the screen, 49 Media & Values 6 (1989). On the undervaluation of women's caretaking
in the context of child custody standards, see Mary E. Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth,
Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S Cal Rev L & Women's Stud (forthcoming 1992).
'15 See John Feinstein, Hard Courts 201-02 (Villard, 1991).
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ubiquitous message confirms reality: a woman's body determines
her value, even as a business professional. 58 Advertising is particu-
larly damaging to women; it sells products to women by making
women feel inadequate.'59
Pornography-sexually explicit material presenting women's
subordination as sexy-exemplifies the politics of sexuality in the
media. Andrea Dworkin states: "The major theme of pornography
as a genre is male power, its nature, its magnitude, its use, its
meaning.... Male power is the raison d'etre of pornography; the
degradation of the female is the means of achieving this power. 160
And pornographic themes-that women are sex objects available
for male pleasure at all times-pervade mainstream media such as
MTV and visual advertising. 161
Children's television programs are actually more sexist than
programs for adults. A 1982 study found that women and minori-
ties appeared even less in children's television than in prime time.
When present, women were "portrayed in a more stereotyped man-
ner in children's programming than in prime-time program-
ming. '16 2 Children's television has not improved since 1982. As of
late April, 1991, no Saturday mornihg children's show featured a
girl heroine. 3 The networks had cancelled the only Saturday
morning cartoon show with a female lead because only girls were
watching the show.6 Girls will watch shows with boys in leading
roles, but boys will not watch shows with female leads. 5 Many
shows, like Garfield, are essentially all male; others may have one
female, under the "Smurfette principle." The Smurfette principle
presents "a group of male buddies ... accented by a lone female,
stereotypically defined."'61 6 The message: "boys are the norm, girls
the variation; boys are central, girls peripheral; boys are individu-
als, girls types."'16 7 Children's television also emphasizes the impor-
158 See generally, Naomi Wolf, The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used
Against Women (Morrow, 1991); Robin Tolmach Lakoff and Raquel L. Scherr, Face Value:
The Politics of Beauty (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).
1 Wolf, The Beauty Myth at 276-77 (cited in note 158).
0 Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women 24-25 (Dutton, 1989).
"I' See, for example, Fred Pelka, "Dreamworlds" How the Media Abuses Women, 21
On The Issues 20 (1991).
"I John Corry, Children's TV Found Dominated by White Men, NY Times C14 (Jul
15, 1982).
... Lynn Hecht Schafran, The Smurfette Principle, NY Times 6-12 (Apr 28, 1991).
164 Id.
'" Bill Carter, Children's TV, Where Boys Are King, NY Times Al (May 1, 1991).
166 Katha Pollitt, The Smurfette Principle, NY Times 6-22 (Apr 7, 1991).
167 Id.
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tance of physical appearance for girls. 68 Children's video games
are worse: when female humans appear, which is rare, they are in
need of rescue by the male hero. Female figures in such games are
rarely active.16 9
American media, particularly television, film, and video games,
promote violence. Most of the empirical evidence on the effect of
television and film violence indicates that it stimulates, rather than
purges, aggression.' 70 Media violence almost always takes place in
the context of stereotypical sex roles. It is rare for a woman to use
violence other than as an agent of a man or as a crazy person. Mili-
tary video games present military activities in an abstract context,
without blood or pain or suffering. The military use video "games"
as training devices, and civilians use them as recreational
activities. 7 '
As a result of free speech in the media-as well as sexist
speech elsewhere in the culture-women face three problems.
First, the media silences women. This is true on the most literal
level. For example, whether in news, sports, or other programs, it is
overwhelmingly men who speak on television. When women do
speak, they usually speak others' words rather than their own. And
when women are authorities, they tend to espouse anti-women
positions.12
The media free market is not a market without censors,
though the censors are not governments. Women's speech is cen-
sored directly by media executives and by advertisers who control
the substantive content of articles and programs in magazines and
on television. 73 Women's speech is censored indirectly by media
168 See Butler and Paisley, Women and the Mass Media at 150-51 (cited in note 151).
Eugene F. Provenzo, Jr., Video Kids: Making Sense of Nintendo 61 (Harvard,
1991):
In a sample of 100 video arcade games, [Terri] Toles determined that 92 percent of the
games did not include any female roles, and that of the remaining 8 percent of the
games, 6 percent had females assuming "damsel in distress" roles and 2 percent in
active roles. Interestingly, in the case of the two females who do take active roles,
neither is human-one being a Mama Kangaroo attempting to retrieve her child and
the second a feminized blob, Ms. Pac-Man.
170 See, for example, L. Rowell Heusmann and Neil M. Malamuth, Media Violence and
Antisocial Behavior: An Overview 42(3) J Soc Issues 1 (1986).
'7 Provenzo, Video Kids at 132-35 (cited in note 169); Terri Toles, Video Games and
American Military Ideology, in Vincent Mosco and Janet Wasko, 3 Critical Communica-
tions Review: Popular Culture and Media Events 207, 217-21 (Ablex, 1985).
',' See text accompanying note 155.
,, See Sunstein, 59 U Chi L Rev at 282 (cited in note 2); Gloria Steinem, Sex, Lies &
Advertising, Ms. 18 (Jul/Aug 1990).
1992]
The University of Chicago Law Review
portrayals of feminists as irrational, unattractive, man-hating
lesbians."
Second, market speech harms women more than men by im-
peding women's ability to develop as autonomous individuals. In a
world of inequality, where men control a disproportionate share of
resources and women have a disproportionate need for resources
because of their responsibility for children, it often pays for women
to present themselves as attractive sex objects. But women also in-
ternalize the beauty standard and judge themselves inadequate. In
a 1984 Glamour survey, seventy-five percent of women between
the ages of eighteen and thirty-five believed they were fat, though
only twenty-five percent were fat by medical standards. More
"heartbreaking," and a greater barrier to women's autonomous
selfhood, "respondents chose losing ten to fifteen pounds above
success in work or in love as their most desired goal."' 5 Because of
the implicit and explicit messages they receive about their abilities
and worth, women have lower self-esteem and confidence than
men. Pornography teaches women through concrete physical expe-
rience and example that they are worthless and that they exist to
service men.
The third problem for women is the media focus on violence
and its glorification. This culture of violence is alien to more
women than men. Men use violence against women more than
women use it against men. 76 The media's glorification of violence,
together with the video-game mentality visible during the Gulf
War, encourages citizens to view United States military aggression
as a spectator sport, one in which men dominate.
These problems exist not only for American women but also
for women throughout the world, given the high levels at which we
export American media. People in other cultures viewing western
media are likely to associate feminism with the pervasive images of
women in western media, and hence with the sexualization of
women. As a result, women in other cultures encounter more diffi-
culty in objecting to their status; they can easily be tarred as "fem-
inists," decadent as well as disloyal because western. American me-
dia thus silences women in other societies, forcing them to betray
' See Paula Kamen, Feminist Fatale: Voices from the "Twentysomething" Genera-
tion Explore the Future of the "Women's Movement" 63-74 (Donald I. Fine, 1991).
11 Wolf, The Beauty Myth at 185-86 (cited in note 158).
'71 See text accompanying notes 170-71.
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either their sex or their culture.1 77 In addition, the allure of west-
ern glamor makes it more difficult for many women and girls to
become autonomous selves, rather than the playthings western me-
dia suggests women are. 1 8
These problems impede women's political success in the
United States and elsewhere. "Free" speech in a market means
that those with the ability to pay are able to speak the most. This
is true for political speech. Women are poorer than men and have
greater economic responsibility for children. These realities mean
men have more disposable income to spend on political speech.
Current case law constitutionally protects this differential. 79
Speech and effective communication are necessary precondi-
tions for having one's needs recognized in the political process.
Low self-esteem compounds this differential, since it translates
into feelings that one is not entitled to more.18 0 Particularly in an
individualistic culture such as the United States, low self-esteem
and feelings of disentitlement impede solutions which must be
both structural and political, such as the support systems women
need and enjoy in the rest of the North Atlantic community of
nations.' 8 '
The media's cultivation of violence also has political effects.
Women oppose violence more than men do; the glorification of vio-
lence impedes action to suppress it, such as passage of gun control
legislation or refusal to go to war.
The reader may object that the Free Speech Clause protects
feminist speech today just as it protects other speech, and that
,77 See, for example, Leila Ahmed, Feminism and Feminist Movements in the Middle
East, A Preliminary Exploration: Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen, in Azizah al-Hibri, ed, Women and Islam 153, 162 (Pergamon Press, 1982).
178 One writer has noted that the combination of Western exports of media violence
and weaponry to third world countries "satiate[s] the Third World in patterns of brutality."
Sissela Bok, Alva Myrdal: A Daughter's Memoir 346 (Addison-Wesley, 1991). In A Daugh-
ter's Memoir, Bok discusses her mother's acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982. The
speech discusses these themes generally. See Alva Myrdal, Disarmament, Technology and
the Growth in Violence, reprinted in Les Prix Nobel 1982: Nobel Prizes, Presentations,
Biographies and Lectures 222, 228 (Acmquist & Wiksell, 1983).
9 Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976) (invalidating campaign expenditure ceilings, en-
suring that those with more funding have a larger political voice).
' o See Linda Gordon, What Does Welfare Regulate?, 55 Soc Res 609, 623 (1988):
Women's movements have had a particularly erratic, discontinuous history. This is be-
cause women's sense of entitlement is tenuous, easily reinterpreted as selfish, women
being raised to define their virtue in terms of selflessness.
181 See, for example, Sylvia Ann Hewlett, When the Bough Breaks: The Cost of
Neglecting Our Children 173-82 (Basic, 1991); Sheila B. Kamerman and Alfred J. Kahn,
What Europe Does for Single-Parent Families, 93 Pub Int 70 (Fall 1988).
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without this protection, women pressing for change would be worse
off. But a comparison of government censorship of feminist speech
in England and the United States suggests that the American Free
Speech Clause is not the critical factor when feminist speech is
permitted. England has no written constitution and hence no Free
Speech Clause. Historically, both England and the United States
censored much feminist speech, even simple information about
birth control, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries." 2 Neither country's government censors private feminist
speech. The United States, however, does censor some feminist
speech today: doctors receiving certain federal funding cannot
mention abortion to a pregnant woman, even when abortion is the
safest available treatment. 83 This comparison suggests that the
source of government's unwillingness to censor private feminist
speech is not the Free Speech Clause.
The Free Speech Clause does not, in and of itself, cause the
problems "free" speech creates for women. England, for example,
has no Free Speech Clause and yet has sexist speech. My main
point is that the Free Speech Clause does more for men than for
women, protecting speech that supports patriarchy. In addition,
the Free Speech Clause impedes needed reform. It makes many
direct forms of regulation of sexist speech unconstitutional. It also
gives constitutional legitimacy to opponents' arguments even when
the Constitution might not bar such reform.
I suggest a number of ways in which we could interpret or
amend the Free Speech Clause to avoid or lessen the problems dis-
cussed in this Section. We could redefine or amend the Free
Speech Clause to allow more equitable limits on spending for polit-
ical speech.'8 4 The Free Speech Clause could be redefined or
amended to allow government to regulate speech in ways suggested
by Andrea Dworkin, Catharine MacKinnon, Mari Matsuda, and
Cass Sunstein. For example, Dworkin and MacKinnon would give
those harmed by pornography a right to damages.8 5 Matsuda sug-
gests that the United States should limit racist hate speech, as do
'82 Elizabeth Barrett Browning was censored in the United States (Boston) and Eng-
land. Contraceptive information was banned in both countries. Anne Lyon Haight, Banned
Books: Informal Notes on Some Books Banned for Various Reasons at Various Times and
in Various Places 49, 63-64, 74-75, 77 (Bowker, 1970).
183 See Rust v Sullivan, 111 S Ct 1759, 1767 (1991).
184 This interpretation would necessarily overrule Buckley, 424 US 1.
182 See Andrea Dworkin and Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography and Civil Rights:
A New Day for Women's Equality 139-41 (DworkinfMacKinnon, 1988) (model anti-
pornography ordinance).
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other liberal democracies (including England) .186 Sunstein suggests
that government intervention should be permissible if it does not
abridge speech but rather expands the market in speech by subsi-
dizing or otherwise enabling speech that would not otherwise be
heard.'8 7 Under Sunstein's "New Deal for Speech," for example, it
might be permissible for the FCC to take sexism or ownership by
women into account in licensing."8 In addition, Sunstein suggests
that the free speech principle should be understood to be centered
above all on political deliberation.189 Under this approach, other
forms of speech may be regulated for illegitimate reasons, but on
the basis of a lesser showing of harm. 90
Perhaps we should amend the Bill of Rights to make such re-
form seem possible. The African National Congress (ANC) draft
Bill of Rights, for example, includes both a free speech provision' 9'
and a provision that "[e]ducational institutions, the media, adver-
tising and other social institutions shall be under a duty to dis-
courage sexual and other types of stereotyping.1' 92 In addition, the
ANC draft Bill of Rights includes an affirmative action provision
that would seem to permit government funding of, or preferences
for, women's speech or nonsexist speech,19 3 and another authoriz-
ing restrictions of racist or sexist speech.194
In this Section, I have discussed problems that "free" speech
in a market economy poses for women. Women are silenced.
"I6 Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 Mich L Rev 2320, 2346-47, 2380-81 (1989).
'8 Sunstein, 59 U Chi L Rev at 267-69 (cited in note 2).
'~ See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v FCC, 110 S Ct 2997 (1990) (upholding constitution-
ality of requirement that transfers of certain "distress sale" licenses go to minority-con-
trolled firms). The example is mine, rather than Sunstein's, and he might not agree.
89 Sunstein, 59 U Chi L Rev at 301 (cited in note 2).
190 Id.
19, African National Congress, A Bill of Rights for a Democratic South Af-
rica-Working Draft for Consultation, Art 4, § 1 (on file with U Chi L Rev) ("There shall
be freedom of thought, speech, expression and opinion, including a free press which shall
respect the right to reply.").
29 Id at Art 7, § 5.
Id at Art 13, § 1 ("Nothing in the Constitution shall prevent the enactment of legis-
lation, or the adoption by any public or private body of special measures of a positive kind
designed to procure the advancement and the opening up of opportunities, including access
to education, skills, employment and land, and the general advancement in social, economic
and cultural spheres, of men and women who in the past have been disadvantaged by
discrimination.").
"' Id at Art 14, § 4("... the State may enact legislation to prohibit the circulation or
possession of materials which incite racial, ethnic, religious, gender or linguistic hatred,
which provoke violence, or which insult, degrade, defame or encourage abuse of any racial,
ethnic, religious, gender or linguistic group.").
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Women have difficulty developing as autonomous selves with as
much confidence as men. And women live in a culture permeated
by male violence. I have suggested a number of reforms that
should be considered. If the First Amendment cannot be inter-
preted to allow such reforms, we should consider changing it, since
the problems impede women's ability to participate effectively in
the political system.
III. THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
The drafters of the Constitution saw the ability of armed citi-
zens to oppose national government as an important check on the
misuse of federal governmental power, with its "standing army of
lackeys and hirelings (mercenaries, vagrants, convicts, aliens, and
the like)."' 195 The Second Amendment to the Constitution guaran-
tees "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms."'19 6 This
amendment has one of three meanings: either it grants states the
right to organize citizens into state militias, or it grants individual
citizens the right to bear arms (against the state and one another),
or it grants both. 97 Each of these readings is troubling from the
perspective of women.
A. State Militias
One reading of the Second Amendment is that it limits the
ability of the federal government to limit state militias: citizens
have the right to bear arms for the state.'98 But the right of states
to organize militias of citizens has meant that only men may bear
arms in military organizations, even after women received the vote
and became, one might have thought, full citizens. 9 9 Women are
still forbidden to bear arms in combat units, both in state militias
and in the national armed services; women may serve in the militia
... Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131, 1163
(1991).
US Const, Amend II.
Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On
Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L J 661, 662 (1989);
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L J 637, 644-45, 648-51,
655-56 (1989); John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda, and J. Nelson Young, Constitutional
Law § 10.2 n 4 (West, 3d ed 1986). Elaine Scarry has argued that the right of citizens to
bear arms is inconsistent with the use of nuclear weapons. Elaine Scarry, War and the So-
cial Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U Pa L Rev
1257 (1991).
198 Levinson, 99 Yale L J at 644-45 (cited in note 197); Brown, 99 Yale L J at 661-62
(cited in note 197).
"I See Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1202-03 (cited in note 195).
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and federal services only in limited numbers and in limited
positions 00
Were women fully integrated in combat units in state militia,
they would almost certainly serve in combat when state units are
called up to fight at the federal level during national emergencies,
given the integrated structure of the military. The state militia,
together with the national army, navy, marines, and air force, form
the United States military. Both the state militia and national
armed services are delineated in Article I of the Constitution. It
mentions the "organized" 201 state militia (or national guards) and
the federal armed services. The state National Guards are under
the command of the governors 0 2 unless called into the service of
the United States by the President pursuant to his power under
Article II, § 2.203 The Congress has the power to organize, arm, and
discipline the state militia (National Guard) and to govern "such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States."2 04 But the states have the reserved power to appoint of-
ficers to the militia (National Guard) and to train them "according
to the discipline prescribed by Congress." In addition, Congress
and the President have the power to raise and deploy federal ar-
mies. At the drafting of the Bill of Rights, the militia referred to
male citizens drafted at the local or state level (citizen-soldiers)
and the federal armies referred to volunteers (mercenaries).0 5
When the United States engages in war, the state National
Guards are routinely called and integrated into active forces, both
combat and noncombat. National Guard units served in World
War I, World War II, the Korean War, Panama,2 0 6 and the Gulf
War. National Guard units have often played heroic roles in for-
20 See, for example, Women in Uniform, Boston Globe 3 (Jun 19, 1991) ("Women con-
stituted 11 percent of U.S. armed forces as of December 1990"); Letters to the Editor USA
Today 11A (Jul 2, 1991) (52% of Army jobs open to women; 97% of Air Force jobs; 59% of
Navy jobs; 20% of Marine jobs).
201 There is also the unorganized militia, but it does not seem to be of any practical
importance today. The unorganized militia is defined in the United States Code as consist-
ing "of all able-bodied males" 17 to 44 who are, or have declared their intent to be, citizens
of the United States unless they are members of the organized militia or of the federal
armed forces. 10 USC §§ 311, 312 (1991).
'02 Richard Halloran, With Roots in State and in Past, Guard Has Many Missions, NY
Times A16 (Aug 23, 1988).
... US Const, Art II, § 2. Article I, § 8 provides that Congress cannot appropriate
money for the army "for a longer Term than two Years."
20. US Const, Art I, § 8.
.0 Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1168 (cited in note 195).
206 Halloran, NY Times at A16 (cited in note 202); Rudy Abramson, U.S. Again Looks
to the Reservists, LA Times Al (Aug 23, 1990) (only a few National Guard units served in
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eign wars. For example, in World War I, the earliest troops in com-
bat, and those who saw the most combat, were National Guards,
including the famous "42d (Rainbow) Division composed of Guard
units from many states, including the 69th Infantry Regiment from
New York. '20 7 The government mobilized the National Guards for
World War II prior to any draft, and over a year before the coun-
try entered the war. Many played important combat roles. For ex-
ample, the 38th Infantry Division fought in the Philippines. 2 8 To-
day, the reserves play a central role in defense strategy. They are
an integral part of any fighting force, capable of being quickly
deployed and integrated with active troops, as illustrated by past
wars. 20 9 Thus the full integration of women into the National
Guard would mean full integration into the federal forces unless
the various branches reorganized to limit women's integration into
combat. That should be impermissible if women have a right to be
treated as full citizen-soldiers.
As Akhil Amar has noted, militia service, along with jury ser-
vice and voting, are political rights and obligations of citizens in a
democracy. 210 Exclusion of women from militia service in combat
denies women the obligations of full citizenship. This denial inevi-
tably translates into disadvantaging women as citizens by depriv-
ing them of power they would otherwise share more equally with
men. I discuss two concrete problems for American women.
First, keeping women out of combat maintains the image of
the male warrior, who is superior to physically passive women who
need his protection and cannot resist his violence. 21' This is impor-
tant on many levels: in terms of the effect of these images on the
culture in general and in terms of the lives of individual women
and men. The military trains men to operate within a macho cul-
ture with the belief that they are superior to women. New male
recruits are called "girls" and "ladies" until they earn a masculine
label.212 They march to a sexist and racist cadence: "I don't know
Vietnam, in part because of a perceived need to keep them available in the event they were
needed in Europe).
107 Halloran, NY Times A16 (cited in note 202).
208 Id (this is the unit in which Vice President Quayle later served).
209 Abramson, LA Times 1A (cited in note 206).
210 See Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1202-03 (cited in note 195); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pur-
suit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L Rev 499, 499-500
(1991).
211 See generally Karst, 38 UCLA L Rev 499 (cited in note 210).
212 Christine L. Williams, Gender Differences at Work: Women and Men in Nontradi-
tional Occupations 69 (California, 1989).
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but I've been told, Eskimo pussy is mighty cold. ' 213 They learn
about venereal diseases from "Suzy Rottoncrotch. ' '214 Pictures of
nude women are common." 5 In the late 1980s, Marine recruits at
Parris Island, South Carolina, marched behind a sign with a naked
woman on it and another with a skull and crossbones and the
words "kill, rape, pillage, burn."2 6 The boys and men trained in
this system interact with women both within and outside the mili-
tary. Men who chant these cadences and learn to consume pornog-
raphy in the military become husbands, fathers, employees, em-
ployers, voters and politicians. Their experiences in the military
are likely to make them less willing to accept women as leaders or
to sympathize with the problems of women constituents.
The other side of this coin is that keeping women out of com-
bat positions in the military supports the taboo against women us-
ing force, especially lethal force. The socialization of girls and
women encourages them to be less physically aggressive than boys
and men, and boys and men are socialized to expect girls and
women to be passive in response to their violence.2" 7 It is revealing
that current military rules do not exclude women from combat
zones (i.e., do not keep women out of danger), but rather keep
women from using lethal force.2"8 Maintaining male control of le-
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. The author of this study reports that "[i]n the lounge of the student squadron
where I interviewed female pilots, pictures of nude women and 'Playboy' insignias were
tacked on the waIls." In civilian life, such workplaces would constitute sexual harassment.
See, for example, Ellison v Brady, 924 F2d 872 (9th Cir 1991); Robinson v Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F Supp 1486 (M D Fla 1991).
, Marines' 'rape' slogan draws fire, Wisc State J 7A (Oct 4, 1989).
21 See Williams, Gender Differences at Work at 54 (cited in note 212) (policies that
prohibit women from direct combat but expose them to indirect combat constitute a male
protection racket); Pauline Burt and Patricia O'Brien, Stopping Rape: Successful Survival
Strategies (Pergamon, 1985) (study of many connections between passivity and rape). See
also Jalna Hanmer and Elizabeth Stanko, Stripping Away the Rhetoric of Protection: Vio-
lence to Women, Law and the State in Britain and the U.S.A., 13 Intl J Soc L 357, 370
(1985) ("Essentially women in today's society are caught in a bind; male violence to women
forces women to turn to men for protection.").
21' See Williams, Gender Differences at Work at 54 (cited in note 212). During the
Panamanian invasion, women drove other soldiers under sniper fire and one woman, Cap-
tain Linda Bray, led a military police company in a firefight. 2 Army Women Being Investi-
gated for Disobeying Order in Panama, NY Times A20 (Jan 21, 1990). An uproar followed
over whether in fact Captain Bray had led troops in combat (in violation of military rules)
and whether women should be allowed in combat positions. There was, however, no discus-
sion of whether women should be kept out of combat zones as long as in noncombat posi-
tions, such as driving under sniper fire. See, for example, Tony Kornheiser, Capt. Bray and
a Dogged Assault, Wash Post D1 (Jan 12, 1990); Judy Mann, The Battle Has Just Begun,
Wash Post C3 (Jan 5, 1990). Several enlisted women in the military police were also in
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thal force clearly preserves male interests both with respect to con-
trol of the military itself (a powerful institution in its own right)
and with respect to men's power over women through physical in-
timidation throughout society.
Integrating women into the military would change the way we
raise girls and decrease male violence against women. We treat
girls and boys differently even as infants and children. As babies,
boys are more likely to be tossed about. We expect boys to be
tough and not to cry. We treat girls as more physically vulnerable
and expect them to be less active physically. Girls' sports programs
are different from boys': serious girls' sports are rarely aggressive
contact'team sports. Were women present in the military and in
combat positions in proportion to their presence in the population,
we probably would treat girls differently. There probably would be
less violence against women, because women would be less passive
physically and because military training would be less sexist. There
is, for examPle, evidence that men who are or have been in the
military are more likely to batter their wives.21 9 Were women and
men trained in the same system, they would be more likely to in-
teract as equals elsewhere.
Women's exclusion from combat units in the military also in-
creases the rate at which our soldiers rape women from the "other"
side during war.220 Our soldiers would be less likely to rape if half
their comrades were women. Although we do not tend to hear
much about this problem, it does happen many times in most
wars.22 We should consider it in assessing the costs and benefits of
including women in the military.
The second major problem, and an extremely troubling one in
a democracy, is that the exclusion of women from the draft and
from combat positions in state militia and federal forces supports
many barriers, erected by government itself, to women's participa-
tion in government and political life. The exclusion of women from
combat means that women have less authority in government than
combat attacking Panamanian defense headquarters, thus raising controversy. See Wilson
Ring, Women Led U.S. Troops into Battle; Captain's Platoon Took PDF Target, Wash
Post Al (Jan 3, 1990); Molly Moore, Combat Role to be Sought for Women; Panama Expe-.
rience Prompts Schroeder, Wash Post A25 (Jan 4, 1990). See also Colman McCarthy,
Women at War, a Foolish First, Wash Post F2 (Jan 14, 1990) ("What kind of society are we
when similar opportunity in killing is the standard for equality.").
219 See Del Martin, Battered Wives 52-53 (Glide, 1976); Walker, The Battered Woman
at 36-37 (cited in note 52).
220 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape 64-65 (Simon &
Schuster, 1975).
221 Id at 31-32.
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men. Because of the exclusion, only men can be military heros.
Women political candidates cannot boast of combat service, which
voters regard as a credential for public office. Women within legis-
lative bodies are regarded as having less authority on military mat-
ters than their male colleagues because they have not "been there;"
they are regarded as less qualified to serve on military oversight
committees and as having less authority if on such committees.
The military services deny women equal employment opportu-
nities because they both limit the numbers of women in the ser-
vices, and they deny women the combat experience necessary for
promotion to high rank. Because they are so often present in token
numbers, women in the services are subject to more sexual harass-
ment than they would be in a more integrated organization.222 No
woman has ever been a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nor is
any woman likely to be as long as women are not present in the
military, in all positions, in proportion to their presence in the
population.
It may be that women are more pacifist than men. If so, ex-
cluding women from combat disarms women's pacifism. Their re-
sistance means less because it has fewer consequences. For exam-
ple, women protesting the war in Vietnam had less authority
because they did not have draft cards to burn and tended therefore
(and for-a host of other reasons) to be relegated to subservient po-
sitions in anti-war organizations.223 Women in Congress who op-
pose military action have less authority because they have not
been in combat. They, unlike Senator Kerrey, cannot oppose a mil-
itary action with the authority of a recipient of the Congressional
Medal of Honor who has lost a leg in combat.224
In addition, both federal and state governments have created a
large number of preferences for veterans. Under these preferences,
many positions in state and federal government are held mostly by
men. For example, proportionately, even fewer federal administra-
222 Karst, 38 UCLA L Rev at 525 (cited in note 210); Susanne Fowler, Breaking Ranks:
Rape, Harassment Claimed by Cadets Chi Trib Womanews 1 (Oct 20, 1991) (allegations of
sexual harassment in military training program at Texas A&M).
223 Sara Ruddick has examined many of the arguments for including women in the mili-
tary to serve peace and concludes that this is an inappropriate strategy because such inter-
ests can best be "cultivated in pacifist organizations." See Sara Ruddick, Pacifying the
Forces: Drafting Women in the Interests of Peace, 8 Signs 471, 485-86 (1983). But, as Jen-
nifer Hertz pointed out to me, Ruddick ignores the ways in which women's exemption from
combat "disarms" them within pacifist organizations and denies them the same authority as
pacifist men who have so much more to lose by resistance to military service.
224 John Cassidy, Democrats Run for Cover as Bush Fever Grips US, Sunday Times 14
(London) (Mar 17, 1991).
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tive law judges are women (5.41 percent) than federal Supreme
Court (11.11 percent), federal Courts of Appeal (10.11 percent), or
federal District Court judges (8.69 percent) because the federal
veterans' preference applies to administrative law judges. 25 In
many states, there are preferences for veterans in state employ-
ment as well. 226 Some state governments are almost entirely male
at high levels for the same reason.227 Thus, as a result of discrimi-
nation in military service, women are less likely to wield govern-
mental power in nonelective offices.228
The reader may object that paying for military service is a
valid governmental purpose, and that veterans' preferences are
simply one form of compensation. But veterans' preferences for
governmental employment are not the equivalent of compensation
schemes. Such preferences give men an edge in running govern-
ment and exclude women from power on the basis of a factor
linked by government itself to sex. In addition, such policies are
anti-democratic, creating a government based on a sort of military
aristocracy rather than a government open to all.
I have discussed two ways in which the exclusion of women
from combat hurts women. The exclusion contributes to cultural
images and the social reality of violent male warriors and physi-
cally passive women in need of their protection. It also creates nu-
merous barriers to women's participation in government and politi-
cal life. As the framers of the Second Amendment realized,
"ultimate political power" lies "with those who control the means
of force. 229
There are, of course, a number of arguments that can be made
against full integration of women into the armed services and Na-
tional Guard. Most women, even most women in the military to-
day, oppose mandatory combat service. Most career military
22 The data on women judges is based on a phone call to Dixie Noble, National Associ-
ation of Women Judges, Williamsburg, Virginia (Oct 3, 1991) (notes on file with U Chi L
Rev). 5 USC § 3105 (1991) authorizes agencies to appoint administrative law judges; 5 CFR
§ 930.203(e) (1990) instructs that agencies should accept highest rated applicants for Ad-
ministrative Law Judge positions "augmented ... by veteran preference."
22I Veterans' organizations also receive postal subsidies denied to women's organiza-
tions. 39 USC § 3626 (1991).
227 See, for example, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v Feeney, 442 US 256,
283 (1979) (Marshall dissenting) (majority upheld veterans' preferences in Massachusetts
despite fact that 98% of veterans were male and virtually all desirable state civil service
employment positions were consequently held by men).
228 See id (as a result of Massachusetts's preference for veterans, "desirable state civil
service employment [is] an almost exclusively male prerogative").
22 David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying
Second Amendment, 101 Yale L J 551, 553 (1992).
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women want to engage in combat service, but ordinary enlisted
women do not.2 30 The military is perhaps the most masculinist in-
stitution in our society; its values and its focus on physical violence
are alien to most women. Nevertheless, until women are full citi-
zens-citizen soldiers on the same basis as men-women will have
less power in government and outside it. They will lack power in
waging peace as well as war, and will face restricted employment
opportunities both in the military and in government.
Today's interpretation of the Bill of Rights does not require
that women be accorded full citizenship. We should interpret the
Second Amendment, especially in light of the Fourteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments, as extending the right to bear arms in
state militia to women. At a minimum, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment should bar veterans' preferences in state employment as long
as women do not receive equal treatment in the military. It is ab-
surd to regard injury as justifying injury as when overt government
discrimination against women in one area justifies non-merit based
standards that exclude most women from many government jobs.
B. The Right of Individual Citizens to Bear Arms
The other possible meaning of the Second Amendment, either
as an alternative reading or in combination with the reading given
above,2"' is that it limits the ability of both the state and federal
governments to regulate gun ownership. In other words, it grants
individuals a right to bear arms, arms which may be used, perhaps
illegally, against other individuals or the state."' Although it is ex-
tremely difficult to compare rates of violence internationally be-
cause of reporting differences, the United States is clearly much
230 Most (about 75% of those interviewed by one reporter in Panama) female officers
believed that women should be able to volunteer for combat. But only a quarter of that
sample thought "that women should be compelled to enter combat units, just as men are."
Charles Moskos, Army Women Atlantic Monthly 7, 77 (Aug 1990). In contrast, about 75%
of enlisted women thought that women should not be allowed into combat. Only 25%
thought that women should be able to volunteer for combat. No enlisted women "favored
forcing women into combat assignments." Id.
231 Amar argues, as noted earlier, that the Second Amendment means both the right of
the individual citizen to bear arms and of the states to organize their citizens into militia.
See Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1162-73 (cited in note 195).
"I Although it is not clear whether the Second Amendment would ban legislation ban-
ning private ownership of guns (see, for example, Levinson, 99 Yale L J at 640 (cited in note
197)), the Second Amendment does appear to make even regulation more difficult, by giving
those who want guns to remain unregulated a constitutional argument and rallying cry.
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more violent than other countries.2 33 Although there is no way to
prove this point, it seems likely that the Second Amendment re-
flects and reinforces the unusual levels of violence in our culture.
Moreover, violence harms women and other groups more than it
harms men like the founding fathers.
Violence devastates poor inner city communities, which are
made more deadly by the availability of guns. Women in the inner
cities where crime is highest lead lives circumscribed by violence.
Intolerable levels of violence victimize them and those they love.
They must worry before going outside at night, or even during the
day in some areas.2 34 They worry about their children getting
safely through the school day and back home. Many see their sons
join the violent underworld of drugs and gangs with deadly results:
"[T]he number one cause of death for African-American males be-
tween the ages of fifteen and twenty-four is murder." '235 Men like
the founding fathers-propertied white men-do not live in these
neighborhoods and are not as likely to be victims or perpetrators
of violence as are poor women and men.
To the extent the Second Amendment protects individuals'
rights to own guns, or assists the NRA in resisting effective gun
control legislation, the Second Amendment is a countermajori-
tarian impediment to women's effective use of the political system.
Men are not only more likely to own guns than women, they are
also more likely to oppose gun control.2 e3 For example, in 1985,
fifty percent of men but only twelve percent of women owned
guns.23 7 In 1986, fifty-five percent of women, but only thirty-nine
percent of men, favored laws banning the sale and possession of
handguns in their own community.2 38 Women and men have con-
flicting interests and opinions concerning gun regulation, and the
Constitution enshrines, at least on a rhetorical level, a male
norm.
239
23 See, for example, James D. Wright, et al, Weapons, Crime, and Violence in
America: A Literature Review and Research Agenda 2-4 (US Dept of Justice, 1981).
21' Margaret T. Gordon and Stephanie Riger, The Female Fear 8-22 (Free Press, 1989).
235 Randolph N. Stone, Crisis in the Criminal Justice System, 8 Harv BlackLetter J 33,
39 (1991).
" Katherine M. Jamieson and Timothy J. Flanagan, eds, Sourcebook of Criminal Jus-
tice Statistics 109-11, Tables 2.38-2.43 (US Dept of Justice, 1987).
211 Id at 109, Table 2.38.
211 Id at 110, Table 2.43.
9 See Brown, 99 Yale L Rev at 663-64 (cited in note 197). For evidence that gun con-
trol laws can decrease violence, see Elisabeth Scarff, Evaluation of the Canadian Gun Con-
trol Legislation: Final Report 36, 39, 42, 53, 63, 65, 66, 68 (Ministry of the Solicitor General
of Canada, 1983); Gun Control Laws in Foreign Countries 88-94, 135-36, 157-60 (Law Li-
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Changes to the Second Amendment in light of my criticisms
are easy to imagine. An amendment or new interpretation could
allow effective national bans on gun ownership by individuals. Al-
ternatively, if the Second Amendment affords citizens the right to
bear arms in state militia, that right should be extended to all citi-
zens, regardless of sex.
IV. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM PROTECTIONS
The Bill of Rights contains a number of provisions designed to
guard against governmental misuse of the criminal justice system.
The Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and
seizures. 240 The Fifth Amendment provides for indictment by a
grand jury for serious crimes and for due process in criminal tri-
als.24 ' The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a right to a
trial by jury in criminal cases, and the assistance of counsel for his
defense.242 The drafters intended these provisions to guard against
misuse of the criminal justice system by government, particularly
criminal prosecution of government critics. 243
Nothing in the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment
guards against systemic racism in the operation of the criminal jus-
tice system, or against its systematic misuse to "solve" problems
associated with racism and poverty. In making these points, the
emphasis in this section differs somewhat from the emphasis in
other sections. Here, I stress that the Bill of Rights does less for
poor minorities than it does for propertied white men. In other sec-
tions, I stress that the Bill of Rights does less for women than for
men. This shift is appropriate even though my major concern is
the latter. Although most of those caught in the criminal "justice"
system are men, the problems with the way the system operates in
poor minority communities pose major problems for women in
those communities. One cannot separate the interests of poor mi-
nority women and men; their fates are intertwined in ways without
precise parallel to white women and men, particularly propertied
white women and men. Women who live in communities destroyed
by drugs and by the "war" on drugs are devastated by the destruc-
brary, Library of Congress, 1981) (evidence from Britain mixed, but both Japan and Swe-
den, which have strict gun control laws, have low rates of murders involving firearms).
240 US Const, Amend IV.
241 US Const, Amend V.
242 US Const, Amend VI.
243 Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1175-99 (cited in note 195).
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tion around them even though they themselves are less likely to go
to prison than are their sons, lovers, and husbands.
At the time the Bill of Rights was enacted, whites were free to
enter the home and batter, rape, or kill African Americans with
impunity. This was particularly true for African Americans who
were slaves, but even free or freed African Americans were often
subject to white violence without the criminal law protection af-
forded white men (and white women in some contexts).244 At the
same time, black people, particularly slaves, were often punished
for alleged crimes without any evidence of guilt. For African Amer-
icans in 1791, the criminal "justice" system was part of the prob-
lem, and the Bill -of Rights did nothing to end these systemic
abuses.
Racism persists within the criminal justice system. 45 African
American women receive less protection from the criminal justice
system than white women. When African American women are
raped, their rapists are less likely to serve time than the rapists of
white women.2 46 Defendants in rape prosecutions often succeed by
suggesting that the woman was a prostitute, and this may be espe-
cially effective when women live, as poor and African American
women often must, in neighborhoods where prostitutes are on the
streets. African Americans, women as well as men, more often fall
into the police net because they fit the drug courier image, 241 are
more likely to be treated roughly or beaten severely by the po-
lice,248 and are more likely to be arrested. States are most likely to
244 See, for example, State v Weaver, 3 NC 70, 71 (1798) (justifiable homicide for
master to kill slave or freed servant who forcefully resists master's use of force to compel
obedience).
245 I only outline problems in the criminal justice system here. I am not an expert in
criminal law and cannot provide the in-depth discussion these issues deserve. For a fuller
discussion of these problems, I refer the reader to work by others. Stone, 8 Harv Black-
Letter L J 33 (cited in note 235); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Access to Justice for the American
Underclass, The World & I 463, 469-75 (Jun 1991); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Ra-
cism and the Criminal Law, 73 Cornell L Rev 1016 (1988); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey
v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv L Rev 1388 (1988);
Samuel R. Gross, Race and Death: The Judicial Evaluation of Evidence of Discrimination
in Capital Sentencing, 18 UC Davis L Rev 1275 (1985).
246 Generalized from data that finds that black offenders are sentenced most harshly
when their victims are white, Alfred Blumstein, et al, eds, 1 Research on Sentencing: The
Search for Reform 101 (National Academic Press, 1983). See also Gary D. LaFree, The Ef-
fect of Sexual Stratification by Race on Official Reactions to Rape, 45 Am Soc Rev 842, 852
(1980).
117 Editorial, Bringing Sanity to Seizure Laws, Chi Trib 2 (Sep 1, 1991).
248 See, for example, Frank Clifford and John L. Mitchell, Incident Gives City a Na-
tional Black Eye; Image: Old Memories of Free-Swinging Cops Are Revived, LA Times Bi
(Mar 7, 1991) (reporting on Rodney Glen King police beating incident in Los Angeles).
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impose the death penalty on African American defendants whose
victims were white.249
Moreover, the criminal justice system is used today to "solve"
problems caused by poverty-drugs and drug-related crime. As
Randolph Stone has noted, "[t]he war on drugs has devastated the
criminal justice system" as well as "some segments of the African-
American community. '25 Today, "the judicial system has become
an assembly line."'251 Most defendants do not receive trial by jury
or the opportunity to confront witnesses against them.252 Because
judges are pressured to treat cases summarily, counsel is more im-
portant than ever. But effective assistance of counsel is often de-
nied, particularly to the poor or those accused of drug-related
crimes. Public defenders handle unmanageable caseloads. 253 In
places without public defenders, poor defendants must rely on
court-appointed counsel, who are often required to work pro bono
or for token fees. 254
Once dragged into the criminal "justice" net, the consequences
can be devastating, even if police and prosecutors lack sufficient
evidence to proceed to trial. Under federal law and many states'
laws, if the police suspect that property is related to drugs, they
can seize it on grounds as slight as those required for a search war-
rant:2 55 probable cause to believe that the property was involved in
illegal activities. 256 Seizure of property makes it more difficult to
"I McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279, 286-87 (1987).
250 Stone, 8 Harv BlackLetter L J at 36 (cited in note 235).
"' Id at 34.
M For a description of the problem, see Schulhofer, The World & I at 474 (cited in
245) (As a result of our resource decisions, "85-90 percent of criminal convictions are ob-
tained by guilty plea.").
251 See Stone, 8 Harv BlackLetter L J at 34 (cited in note 235):
Lawyers in our felony trial division [Cook County Public Defender's office] have one
hundred pending cases, while those in our Homicide Task Force handle twenty-three
pending murder cases each; one-third to one-half of those homicide cases are death
penalty cases.
25, See Schulhofer, The World & I at 469-75 (cited in note 245).
I" See, for example, Walter J. Van Eck, The New Oregon Civil Forfeiture Law, 26
Willamette L Rev 449, 476-78 (1990); Thomas E. Payne, An Introduction to Civil Forfeiture
in Mississippi: An Effective Law Enforcement Tool or Cash Register Justice?, 59 Miss L J
453, 463 (1989); Steven L. Kessler, Quo vadis? Assessing New York's Civil Forfeiture Law, 4
Touro L Rev 253 (1988).
256 The federal civil forfeiture provision is at 21 USC § 881. For a discussion, see Barry
Tarlow, Forfeiture Trends, 15 The Champion 42 (Nov 1991); Mark A. Jankowski, Temper-
ing the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture in Drug
Cases, 76 Va L Rev 165 (1990); G. Richard Strafer, Civil Forfeitures: Protecting the Inno-
cent Owner, 37 U Fla L Rev 841 (1985); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a
Criminal (parts III & IV), 87 Colum L Rev 920 (1987); Terrance G. Reed, The Defense
Case for RICO Reform, 43 Vand L Rev 691, 701-11 (1990); Jeffrey M. Evans, "Civil" For-
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hire counsel either to recover the property or for criminal defense.
Given the fiscal crunch facing most law enforcement systems, these
statutes create powerful incentives for misuse of seizure without
trial.
Using the criminal justice system to battle problems caused by
poverty and racism results in a prison population that is half Afri-
can American men.2 51 There are more African American men in
prison than in college.2 58 The incarceration rate in the United
States is now the highest known in the world: 426 prisoners per
100,000 population. South Africa is second with a rate of 333 per
100,000 and the Soviet Union third with a rate of 268 per 100,000.
Most of the world has much lower rates. For example, Western Eu-
ropean rates are 35-120 per 100,000.259
Although poor pregnant addicts cannot find the in-patient
medicaid-funded rehabilitation treatment they need, they are in-
creasingly subject to criminal prosecution for delivering drugs to
minors. 60
The misuse of the criminal justice system to address problems
of poverty and racism has political effects. People wrongly con-
victed of many crimes cannot vote in state elections while serving
time and in most states even thereafter.26  More importantly,
keeping the poor impoverished-rather than dealing with poverty
effectively-means keeping them' politically ineffective. The poor,
disproportionately, do not vote and do not participate in political
life. 262
The protections in the Bill of Rights against misuse of the
criminal justice system do not "cause" these problems. But the Bill
of Rights does less to guard against misuse of the criminal justice
system to combat problems of poverty and racism than it does to
guard against misuse of the criminal justice system to silence polit-
ical dissidents. Furthermore, the misuse of the Bill of Rights to
feitures Under State RICO Laws: A Legislative Attempt to Circumvent the Constitution, 8
Crim Just J 293 (1986).
25 Stone, 8 Harv BlackLetter L J at 35 (cited in note 235).
258 Though one year in prison costs as much as an education at a four-year college. Id.
259 Mark Mauer, Americans Behind Bars: A Comparison of International Rates of In-
carceration 4-5 (The Sentencing Project, 1991). Incarceration rates have been dropping in
the Soviet Union. Ten years ago they were estimated to be about 25% to 100% higher than
current estimates. Id at 4, 6.
"" See Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy and the Law: Rethinking the
Problems of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, Hastings L Rev (forthcoming 1992).
261 Shepard's Lawyer's Reference Manual 575-95 table A-31 (1983) (survey of voter
qualifications).
262 See text accompanying notes 271-73.
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facilitate the war on drugs has undermined specific constitutional
guarantees as applied to poor minorities, especially those accused
of drug involvement, by denying them a fair trial with effective
assistance of counsel. Thus the general protections of the Bill of
Rights against misuse of the system have been effectively de-
stroyed by the drug war for many poor people, who are subjected
to assembly-line justice without effective counsel. Finally, the Bill
of Rights does not provide any affirmative economic or educational
protections for the poor, protections which might ensure that
problems of poverty be effectively addressed.
An interpretation of or amendment to the Bill of Rights might
lessen these problems by directly addressing the economic and
educational needs of the poor and by providing provisions more
effective at ensuring justice for all within the criminal justice sys-
tem. After discussing the "property" right enshrined in the Fifth
Amendment, I suggest a number of positive economic and educa-
tional rights that we could incorporate in the Bill of Rights.63 In
addition, the Bill of Rights could include provisions guaranteeing
effective assistance of counsel and fair trials. For example, we
could interpret effective assistance of counsel as proscribing the
seizure of assets used to pay counsel and as requiring reasonable
caseloads for public defenders and reasonable fees for court-ap-
pointed counsel.6 4 At a minimum, government should be pre-
vented from seizing assets without a trial, and money paid to a
lawyer prior to execution of a judgment should be no more cover-
able than money paid to any other creditor. We could obtain this
result by reasonable interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's Tak-
ings Clause.
V. SECURITY AT HOME
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
White male heads of family during the revolution and today face
threats to physical security at home from two kinds of intruders:
-government actors and criminals. The criminal law has been used
to protect against the latter, if not always effectively; the Fourth
Amendment guards against the former.
11 See text accompanying notes 274-80.
... For these and additional suggestions, see Schulhofer, The World & I at 475 (cited in
note 245).
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Women, by contrast, face a third major source of physical in-
security within the home: battery and rape by someone who lives
in the home-their sexual partners. Yet we have never accorded
protection against domestic violence at the level accorded other
crimes of violence. The Fourth Amendment does not address do-
mestic violence. The Fourth Amendment protects women against
governmental assault, but leaves governments free to treat "do-
mestic" assaults differently from other crimes. Indeed, the criminal
codes of many states still deny equal criminal protection to wives
who are raped by their husbands.265 Although some states have
eliminated this distinction, others have extended it to nonmarried
cohabitants. ss
These inequities have political consequences. Women who fear
violence redefine themselves as wanting to give what might other-
wise be taken away, instead of asserting their own interests,2 67 par-
ticularly in a politically effective way. Women who are abused
within their most intimate relationships are less able to assert their
interests within those relationships. Abused women are unlikely to
press strongly for change in the political arena, especially when
their interests conflict with the interests of the abuser.
In large part, my criticism is simply that the Fourth Amend-
ment does less for women than it has done for white men, who
drafted it. Protected by the criminal justice system from attacks
by criminals, they added the Fourth Amendment to protect them-
selves from governmental intrusion. The Fourth Amendment is
much less thorough in providing the protections needed by women.
It allows government, police, and prosecutors to treat domestic vio-
lence differently from other violence. Indeed, the Constitution al-
lows government to treat marital rape as noncriminal. The Fourth
Amendment may have affirmatively made women worse off by giv-
ing a constitutional foundation to the notion that a "man's home is
his castle."
One can easily imagine improvements in the Bill of Rights
from the perspective of violence against women. The Bill of Rights
could include an equality standard for sex that would require the
state to respond to domestic violence in the same way it responds
to other crimes, and to proscribe marital rape.2 68 Such constitu-
265 See Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 42 U Fla L Rev 45, 46-48, 46 n 6 (1990).
26 See id at 48 n 11.
167 See West, 3 Wis Women's L J at, 93-111 (cited in note 51).
216 See generally West, 42 U Fla L Rev 45 (cited in note 265).
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tional provisions would not by themselves revolutionize how police,
prosecutors and jurors treat intersexual domestic violence, but
they might contribute to changed attitudes. They would, moreover,
ensure some of the prerequisites for effective control of domestic
violence.
VI. PROPERTY
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall.., be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation. '269 There are a number of problems with this provi-
sion from the perspective of minorities and women. First, and most
dramatically, at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1789,
slaves were property. They were protected as property of others;
they could have no property themselves. This provision of the
Fifth Amendment was an instrument of oppression for African
American women and men.
Second, at the time of the passage of the Bill of Rights, mar-
ried women could not own or control property. Thus, the Fifth
Amendment protected only the property of men and single women.
Third, the protection of "property" meant and means the
privileging of existing distributions, no matter how dubious. Con-
sider, for example, the property rights of the newly-freed people-
vis-a-vis the property rights of their former owners. The fields
cleared and cultivated by the freed people belonged to the owners.
The buildings and plantations built by the freed people belonged
to the owners.
Fourth, while "property" has always included realty and the
goods produced by the kinds of labor in which most men spend
their working lives, we have never recognized women's reproduc-
tive and domestic labor as property. Women's caretaking impedes
women's ability to accumulate property in three distinct ways: (1)
caretaking itself does not tend to produce property; (2) caretaking
tends to limit one's ability to earn property; and (3) caretaking
tends to require consumption of property. As a result, women have
fewer resources than men and are far more likely to be poor.2
Lack of property precludes effective political participation.
The poor vote less often, are less politically active, and have fewer
29 US Const, Amend V.
2 0 See, for example, 163 Current Population Reports: Consumer Income: Poverty in
the United States: 1987 118-19 (US Bureau of the Census, 1989) (slightly under 11% of all
families are poor, though 34% of families headed by women are poor).
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resources with which they can influence elections. It is more diffi-
cult for the poor to make contributions to candidates likely to re-
present their interests or to spend money themselves to advance
candidates or political positions. Yet the Constitution protects the
ability of the rich to spend more politically. 17 ' Although seventy-
six percent of those making over $50,000 a year vote, only thirty-
eight percent of those making less than $5,000 a year vote 272 Re-
gistration is structured so as to discourage registration by the
poor.273
Provisions in a Bill of Rights could lessen these problems. A
Bill of Rights could provide for positive economic rights, ensuring
women economic supports and safety nets as effective as those
available to men. Such a Bill of Rights would be more detailed and
specific, less elegant, brief, and abstract, than the Bill of Rights we
have today. Against this aesthetic loss must be balanced the bene-
fit to women and children, who form the majority of Americans. In
addition, a society in which women have more power would be
more democratic. Its government would have greater legitimacy.
7 4
Affirmative economic rights could include a right to health
care under a national and universal health care system (the details
of which would be specified by legislation); a requirement of a fam-
ily allowance (tied to some independent economic indicator, such
as a fractional percentage of gross national product); caretaking
leave with wage support as part of the unemployment insurance
system (with support required at the level generally provided for
unemployment compensation); government-financed child care; a
requirement that social security benefits be, on average, the same
for women and men (within a limited level of tolerance) ;275 a right
to a decent education (with a ban on financing schools through
property taxes and a requirement that per pupil expenditures be
uniform throughout the United States);276 and a requirement that
breadwinners and homemakers be treated the same with respect to
Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976).
272 Garry Wills, 'New Votuhs', NY Rev Books 3, 3 (Aug 18, 1988).
2 Id.
274 See Linda Gordon, What Does Welfare Regulate? 55 Soc Res 609, 629 (1988).
2'5 For a discussion of the many structural problems in the social security system, see
Mary E. Becker, 89 Colum L Rev 264 (cited in note 17).
276 In New Jersey, where the state supreme court has interpreted the state Constitution
as banning differential school funding levels based on local property taxes, "per-pupil ex-
penditures are still $2,880 in poor districts and $4,029 in wealthy districts." Hewlett, When
the Bough Breaks at 58 (cited in note 181). See generally id at 56-61, 246-49.
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all substantive standards for disability. 77 A ban on abortion
should be seen as a taking (of women's reproductive labor) for gov-
ernment purposes without compensation.2 7 8 The Bill of Rights
should also include a right to abortion, fully paid by the state, in
light of (inter alia) the economic consequences of childbearing for
women.
Further, the Bill of Rights should make family law a matter
within the control of the national government and not the states.
Gender relations in the family are of primary importance for a just
society.279 Setting a framework for just relationships should be a
priority for national government; living within such a framework
should be a prerogative of national citizenship. s°
Like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment does much more for men than for women,
favoring men's productive labor over women's reproductive labor.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment also favors men's
experiences, by enshrining as the "rule of law" a legal system de-
veloped by and for elite white men. In the next Section, I examine
this provision and contrast it with the jury provisions, which now
provide for the participation of all in applying the laws developed
by the few.
VII. DUE PROCESS AND THE JURY PROVISIONS
The Fifth Amendment provides for "due process" before any
person is deprived of "life, liberty, or property. ' 21 The Sixth and
Seventh Amendments provide for a jury trial in criminal and civil
cases.282 The "due process" guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment
thus entitled its framers, mostly elite white men, to the procedures
277 Social Security has different substantive disability standards for homemakers and
breadwinners. See Becker, 89 Colum L Rev at 269 (cited in note 17).
278 In making this point, I do not suggest that women's reproductive ability should be
treated in all respects like alienable property rights. Indeed, I think it a mistake to com-
modify women's bodies by creating a market for their reproductive labor. For a discussion of
the problems with a market approach, see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
Harv L Rev 1849 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special
Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 Colum L Rev 1 (1992). I am
merely stating that government should not be able to take women's reproductive labor with-
out compensation by banning abortion. Women's reproductive labor should, however, be
inalienable.
279 See generally Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (Basic, 1989).
180 1 am indebted to Hendrik Hartog for this idea.
281 US Const, Amend V.
282 US Const, Amends VI and VII. In civil cases, the right applies "where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." US Const, Amend VII.
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and substantive rules of a legal system developed by and for peo-
ple like themselves. At that time, women and African Americans
could not participate as either lawyers or judges.
Today, the legal system remains one developed by and for
propertied white men, with strong, built-in, conservative tenden-
cies, in the form of well-developed substantive rules combined with
rules favoring precedent.28 3 As I have described,284 the overwhelm-
ing majority of legislators and judges continue to be men. "Due
process" continues to mean something quite different for proper-
tied white men and other groups.
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury ... ,11125 At the time the Bill of Rights
was enacted, neither women nor slaves were allowed on juries. As
early as 1880, however, the Supreme Court held that states could
not overtly exclude African Americans from juries under the Four-
teenth Amendment.28 6 But African Americans were effectively ex-
cluded throughout the South until relatively recently. Juries were
drawn from voter rolls which-until the 1960s-included few Afri-
can Americans. And in the North as well as the South, African
Americans could be excluded on the ground of race from any par-
ticular jury prior to the Supreme Court's 1965 Fourteenth Amend-
ment decision in Swain v Alabama 8 7 and its 1986 decision in Bat-
son v Kentucky."" Since these cases, it has been unconstitutional
to exclude African Americans or other racial minorities either from
jury lists or from a particular jury because of race.
A more limited set of rules has developed with respect to
sex.289 The Supreme Court found overt limitations on women's
presence in jury pools to be unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1975.290 But several lower courts have refused to
23 See, for example, Lois G. Forer, Unequal Protection: Women, Children, and the
Elderly in Court (Norton, 1991) (retired judge discussing the many ways in which legal rules
developed by white male judges adversely affect women, children, and the elderly).
284 See text accompanying notes 8-14.
285 US Const, Amend VI.
288 Strauder v West Virginia, 100 US 303, 310 (1880).
287 380 US 202 (1965).
288 476 US 79 (1986).
288 See generally Shirley S. Sagawa, Batson v Kentucky: Will It Keep Women on the
Jury?, 3 Berkeley Women's L J 14 (1987/1988); Note, Sex Discrimination in the Voir Dire
Process: The Rights of Prospective Female Jurors, 58 S Cal L Rev 1225 (1985).
288 Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522 (1975). See also Duren v "Missouri, 439 US 357
(1979). The Supreme Court has held that jury exclusions violate the Sixth Amendment only
when capital sentencing occurs. See Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162 (1986).
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hold unconstitutional the exclusion of women from jury panels
even if the exclusion is on the basis of sex.29' Thus, the right to
trial by a jury selected without discrimination on the basis of sex
remains unavailable to women. Further, minority women remain
without effective protection on the basis of race and sex.292
I suggest three changes to the Bill of Rights in the areas of
due process and jury selection. First, in civil cases there should be
the same protections against sex discrimination in jury selection as
for race.293 Second, women and minorities should be protected
from sex or race discrimination by prosecutors in challenging ju-
rors in criminal cases. Indeed, we might ban all peremptory chal-
lenges by prosecutors.294
Third, judges and legislators, as well as jurors, should re-
present the population. We require that juries be representative
with respect to race and somewhat representative with respect to
sex, but have no constitutional provisions regarding judges or legis-
lators. This is so even though the law developed and applied by
judges and legislators is all the process that is "due" in any dispute
before a jury or a judge. For any group other than white men, who
is on the bench or in the legislature is more important than who is
on the jury.
The Bill of Rights could require that judges represent the pop-
ulation with respect to sex and race. The African National Con-
gress (ANC) Draft Bill of Rights includes a provision that "the ju-
diciary shall be transformed in such a way as to consist of men and
women drawn from all sectors of ... society. ' 295 The Bill of Rights
could provide that women's representation in legislatures at appro-
291 See, for example, United States v Hamilton, 850 F2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir 1988);
State v Olivera, 534 A2d 867, 870 (RI 1987). ,See also State v Gilmore, 511 A2d 1150, 1159 n
3 (NJ 1986). Even when women are on jury panels, they tend to be less influential than the
men on the jury. See Nancy S. Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 Yale
L J 593, 597-98 (1987).
292 Minority women should, one would think, be entitled to more, not less, protection
because of their dual disadvantages. See generally, Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and
the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 Harv CR-CL L Rev 9 (1989).
See also Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U Chi Legal Forum 139.
293 See Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 111 S Ct 2077, 2079 (1991) (race can
not be basis for excluding juror in civil case). Structural changes may also be needed to
accommodate women's different approaches to dispute resolution. See Laura Gaston Dooley,
Sounds of Silence on the Civil Jury, 26 Valp U L Rev 405 (1991).
294 See, for example, Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U Chi L Rev 153, 232 (1989).
295 ANC, A Bill of Rights for a Democratic South Africa Art 14, § 7 (cited in note 191).
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priate levels is of prime importance in a democracy, and authorize
Congress to enact a Voting Rights Act for Women. Such an act
could offset the political problems women face as a result of free-
doms we all value, such as freedom of religion and speech. If we
had separate voting districts for women and men, women would be
represented in legislatures in rough proportion to their presence in
the population.296 Women tend to hold elective office in higher
numbers in multi-member districts,291 under proportional repre-
sentation,298 and with internal party quotas for women candi-
dates.29 9 Our parties already have internal sex-based quotas for
their national committees, and the Democrats have experimented
with quotas for convention delegates. Our parties could be en-
couraged to experiment with such quotas by government funding
tied to the number of women running in open elections.300
CONCLUSION
The Bill of Rights serves the interests of those most like its
drafters: relatively elite white men who tend to own more than
their share of "property." Other groups-particularly women, the
poor, and people of color-have fewer of their needs addressed by
this revered document. I have shown three kinds of problems with
the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
My major point has been critical: the Bill of Rights does less
for other groups than it does for those in the class of propertied
white men; often it perpetuates or even magnifies social inequities
rather than eliminating them. When this happens, the Bill of
Rights becomes part of the problem, rather than the solution. Sec-
ond, the Bill of Rights is often an impediment to reform; this is
219 This is more or less the result with respect to racial minorities under the remedial
scheme of the Voting Rights Act. See, for example, Voting Rights Act Extension, S Rep No
97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 1000-10 (1982).
'97 See, for example, Susan Welch and Albert K. Karnig, Correlates of Female Office
Holding in City Politics, 41 J Pol 478, 486-87 (1979); Janet Clark, et al, Women as Legisla-
tive Candidates in Six States, in Janet A. Flammang, ed, Political Woman 141, 154 (Sage,
1984).
298 See Anne Phillips, Engendering Democracy 80-83 (Pennsylvania, 1991). There are
disadvantages to proportional representation. Proportional representation, like divided gov-
ernment, tends to mean weak government. See Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of
Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries 107-26, 150-68 (Yale,
1984).
2I Phillips, Engendering Democracy at 83-89 (cited in note 298).
300 For example, the national parties could be given so much in federal funds for each
woman in an open election for the House, double that amount for open Senate races, and
triple that amount for open governor races.
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particularly true for the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause
and the Second Amendment insofar as it prevents gun control leg-
islation. Third, the problems ignored or even perpetuated by the
Bill of Rights have political consequences for women and other
outsider groups. More fundamentally, the Bill of Rights has done
too little to ensure that women, a majority group, can exert their
interests effectively in the political system.
I have suggested a number of changes to the individual provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights, changes that we could implement either
as interpretations or as amendments. These changes would make
the Bill of Rights more responsive to the needs of women and
other outsider groups and should produce a more effective demo-
cratic structure.
In this Conclusion, I add three more general criticisms. First,
part of the problem is that the Constitution contains no strong
provision on sex discrimination. If such a provision were in the Bill
of Rights, it might help judges balance other rights, such as free
exercise of religion, against the right of women to social equality.
Such a provision should be a right to substantive, not formal,
equality.30' In addition, as in the ANC Draft Bill of Rights,302 the
Bill of Rights should ban discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation, both because lesbian and gay people are a vulnerable
group needing protection, 303 and because compulsory heterosexual-
ity is a form of discrimination against women.304
301 See, generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
215-49 (Harvard, 1989); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law,
100 Yale L J 1281 (1991).
302 See ANC, A Bill of Rights for a Democratic South Africa, Art 7 § 2 (cited in note
191) ("Discrimination on the grounds of gender, single parenthood, legitimacy of birth or
sexual orientation shall be unlawful."). The European Human Rights Commission has inter-
preted the European Human Rights Convention as banning punishment for at least private
homosexual acts between consenting adults. See Glendon; Rights Talk at 146-58 (cited in
note 20).
However, I realize that a judicially enforced abstract right to sex equality would not do
much for women. The drive for its adoption would drain scarce resources from more effec-
tive strategies for change. See, for example, Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (cited in note 16);
Becker, 1987 S Ct Rev 201 (cited in note 16). I do not, therefore, suggest we should seek
such a right at the present time. I merely mention that, in a Constitution anywhere near
ideal, we would have a substantive sex equality provision.
303 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv L Rev 713, 730-31
(1985); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection For Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L Rev 915, 916 n 5 (1989).
304 See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis L
Rev 187, 187 (1988); John Stoltenberg, You Can't Fight Homophobia and Protect the
Pornographers at the Same Time-An Analysis of What Went Wrong in Hardwick, in
Dorchen Leidholdt and Janice G. Raymond, eds, The Sexual Liberals and the Attack on
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Second, the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the Consti-
tution have created a structure posing obstacles to the implemen-
tation of the sorts of economic support systems and safety nets
present in every other North Atlantic nation. Mary Ann Glendon
makes this point powerfully and persuasively in her most recent
book.3 05 Several features of our Constitution have reinforced the
individualism so dominant in our culture: the absolutist wording of
individual rights in the Bill of Rights; the failure of the Bill of
Rights to include any positive economic rights; and the focus of
both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights on limited govern-
ment as the guarantor of liberty. Given these elements in our con-
stitutional structure, it is not surprising that initial attempts at so-
cial legislation in this country were declared unconstitutional as
violations of the Contracts Clause, a variation on the property
right protected in the Fifth Amendment.306 We abandoned this ap-
proach during the New Deal,30 7 but by then the United States was
far behind the Continent in providing economic support systems.
The gap persists today.308 Had we no written constitution so that a
Lochner era never happened we might live today in a more just
society.30 9
My third and last general criticism has been made before by
Jennifer Nedelsky, among others. Because the Framers focused on
protection of private property as the key to liberty, they devised a
"democratic" anti-majoritarian governmental structure. They saw
the major problem of democracy as the "problem of majority op-
pression. ' ' 10 The solution was to create barriers to ordinary peo-ple's participation, including multiple levels of government and
Feminism 184 (Pergamon, 1990); MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State at 57
(cited in note 301); Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Experience,
in Rich, Blood, Bread, and Poetry 23 (Norton, 1986).
30" See Glendon, Rights Talk at 106-08 (cited in note 20). For a discussion of the sym-
bolic power of the Constitution, see Hendrik Hartog, The Condition of Aspiration and "The
Rights That Belong to Us All", 74 J Amer Hist 1013 (1987).
30. See, for example, Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
307 West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937) (overruling Lochner).
'00 Glendon, Rights Talk at 32-46 (cited in note 20). For a brief discussion of economic
supports in Europe, see Sheila B. Kamerman and Alfred J. Kahn, What Europe does for
Single-Parent Families, 93 Pub Int 70 (Fall 1988).
39 It is also possible that we would live in a fascist dictatorship. For an argument that
a constitution should include provisions "designed to work against precisely those aspects of
a country's culture and tradition that are likely to produce harm through that country's
ordinary political process," see Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 17 U
Chi L Econ Working Paper No 3 (2d series 1991).
3' Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutional-
ism: The Madisonian Framework and its Legacy 220-22 (Chicago, 1990).
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rule by a distant elite."' In addition, the Constitution limited di-
rectly the ability of less-distant state governments to experiment
with the basic structure of the economy.3 12
Seeing the problem of democracy as the problem of majority
oppression of the propertied minority is particularly inappropriate
from the perspective of women. Women are a majority of the pop-
ulation, who have never controlled or even exercised their propor-
tionate share of influence. Surely we should regard men's domina-
tion of positions of power within government as at least a problem
of democracy in light of women's ability to vote during the last
seventy-one years.
We should consider whether other governmental structures
and electoral systems would be more democratic. Three indepen-
dent branches of government minimize governmental action, pre-
serving the status quo. A requirement of coordination among three
independent branches is countermajoritarian and conservative. Ac-
tion is easier in parliamentary systems which integrate the legisla-
tive and executive power. We also should consider other electoral
systems, such as the ones suggested above. 13
These are not all pragmatic proposals for change. Members of
our legislative bodies are not likely to change the way the game is
played when they have won under existing rules. My point is that
our governmental structure is not ideal from the perspective of
women, other outsider groups, or, indeed, democracy. We could
imagine better structures, and many are in place in some parts of
the world. We should not be exporting ours, as is, to Eastern
Europe.
How should we assess a constitutional structure or a Bill of
Rights? I suggest that we should consider, along with other factors,
how well the system facilitates women's political participation,
poverty rates (especially for women and children), physical safety,
and incarceration rates. Measured by these standards, our consti-
tutional system must be found wanting.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 See text accompanying notes 295-300.
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